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NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR Ibrahim S. Kanu

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE The "Operational Code" approach to the study
of political leaders: President Kenneth Kaunda's
philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADE Oct. 1978

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE Dr. W. D. Briggs

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THE "OPERATIONAL CODE" APPROACH TO THE STUDY
OF POLITICAL LEADERS: PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA'S
PHILOSOPHICAL AND INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Political Science
of the University of Windsor in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

by

Ibrahim S. Kanu
Faculty of Graduate Studies
1978

Windsor, Ontario Canada

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the "operational code" of Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of Zambia. As developed by Nathan Leites in his study of the Bolsheviks and later reformulated as a general approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making by Alexander George, operational code beliefs refer to decision-makers' general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics relating to the problem of political action. These beliefs are categorized into two dimensions: (1) The philosophical beliefs, referring to the assumptions and premises of decision-makers regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of conflict and the role of the individual in history; and (2) the instrumental beliefs, referring to ends-means relationship in the context of political action.

The study is presented in four chapters. Chapter One deals with the research framework. This consists of the relevance of the study and a review of some important theoretical dimensions on beliefs, the decision-making and "operational code" approaches. In the section on theoretical dimensions, a conceptual diagramme depicting the theorized relationship between beliefs and decision-making process is presented. In addition, the essence of the questions subsumed under each of the ten belief-categories is briefly explicated.

Chapter Two is a short biography of President Kaunda. It focuses on the President's early life, career as a teacher and long involvement in the nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).

Chapter Three contains the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda. Essentially, the President's philosophical beliefs are predicated on his belief that man is a spiritual being created in the image of God and that he (man) is basically good. Believing thus in God and man's basic goodness, President Kaunda is more optimistic than pessimistic about the prospects of achieving his fundamental goals and values, believes that the political future is both "deterministic" and "indeterministic", that man has some control over his destiny and that chance plays little or no role in human affairs. All of these components constitute the philosophical underpinnings of President Kaunda's Humanism.

Considerably interrelated to these philosophical beliefs are his instrumental beliefs. In essence, the salience of his instrumental beliefs is the promotion and enshrinement of the centrality of man. This calls for the establishment of participatory democratic institutions and the unconditional rejection of any and every means which diminish and subordinate man.

Humanism emerges as the "master-belief" of President Kaunda's operational code beliefs. This is the core belief which influences all the other belief-components. Chapter

Four analyses Kaunda's Humanism in terms of its possible sources. It concludes that his humanist beliefs are rooted on his Christian and African traditional values.

As to the relationship between President Kaunda's operational code beliefs and his political behaviour, an application of the "congruence" procedure to Zambia's policy with regard to Black majority rule struggles in Southern Africa seems to demonstrate a high correlation between his operational code beliefs and Zambia's policy in this issue. Thus it is concluded that while President Kaunda's operational code beliefs may not be capable of predicting his political behaviour and by extension the policies of Zambia in any given issue, a knowledge of it seems indispensable to understanding some of his decisions and Zambia's policies. Based on this conclusion, it is hypothesized that the extent to which operational code beliefs influence decisions or policies depends on the salience of the issues involved. The more salient the issues, the greater the influence of the operational code beliefs of decision-makers on decisions. To the extent that this is valid, the "operational code" approach seems limited in getting at the operative beliefs of leaders of the developing countries. This is because the approach is oriented more to foreign policy decision-making than to decision-making in general.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Any successful human endeavour is inevitably the product of the various contributions of many people. This is particularly true of this project. While I cannot possibly nor adequately express my gratitude and appreciation to all those who have aided me in writing this thesis, I sincerely thank the chairman of my thesis committee, Dr. E. D. Briggs, Professor and Chairman of the Political Science Department; for his friendliness and guidance. But for his patience, gentle and meticulous probing and encouragement, this project would not have survived the outline stage. I am also especially grateful and indebted to the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. W. C. Soderlund, Professor, Political Science Department; and Dr. W. G. Phillips, Professor, Economics Department and Dean of the Faculty of Social Science. Dr. Soderlund's numerous apt suggestions and careful examination has undoubtedly made this exercise a rewarding experience. This thesis has not only benefitted from Dean Phillips' vast knowledge of Zambia, but also from his generosity in providing me with most of President Kaunda's speeches. For this and the various forms of non-academic assistance they have offered me, I am sincerely grateful.

Special thanks is also due to the staff of the Inter-library Loan Service of The Leddy Library for their untiring efforts in procuring many of President Kaunda's books and speeches. Of course, I am solely responsible for any error of fact or interpretation.

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CHAPTER I

THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

The growing awareness that the political behaviour of decision-makers is considerably influenced by their beliefs or belief system has generated a sustaining scholarly endeavour devoted to exploring the relationship between the two variables. This study of the "operational code" beliefs of Dr. Kaunda, President of Zambia, is along this genre of inquiry. Specifically, the purpose of our study is to formulate and analyze the operational code belief system of President Kaunda and to assess its utility in terms of explaining Zambia's policy towards issues of Black majority rule in Southern Africa. In addition, the study attempts to assess the utility of the Operational Code Approach itself.

The relevance of studying the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda stems from issues of world peace and stability. The geographical location of Zambia in the volatile subcontinent of Southern Africa renders considerable importance to its policy with regard to issues of Black majority rule. Southern Africa, specifically South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia) is a seething confrontation of opposing nationalism. In the seemingly inevitable escalation of the confrontation, the

policies of the "front-line" states will to a large extent influence the nature and scope of the conflict. In other words, world peace and stability is largely dependent on the policies of "front-line" states, of which, perhaps, Zambia's is the most crucial.

The implications of the crisis in Southern Africa for world peace and stability can hardly be exaggerated. In a world in which the East-West competition for the minds of men is still very much alive, there exists a very real possibility of superpower confrontation ensuing over Southern Africa. The increasing Western efforts at seeking peaceful solutions to the issue of Black majority rule in Southern Africa and the growing vehement Western condemnation of Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa underscore these implications.

Furthermore, our interest in the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda is related to Zambia's relative success at national development. Zambia, like most developing countries, is plagued by a host of problems associated with modernization. But unlike most of these states, Zambia has been relatively stable. This measure of its success is generally attributed to President Kaunda's leadership.¹ Since the problems of developing countries are in part problems of leadership, a study of President Kaunda's

¹Andrews Roberts, A History of Zambia (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 247.

operational code beliefs may provide us with important insights into enlightened and successful leadership qualities.

IMPORTANCE OF BELIEF SYSTEM: SOME THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS

The study of politics has taken a novel turn in the last two decades or so. With the advent of what is now known as the Behavioural Revolution,² concepts once central in the discipline are gradually being replaced by new ones. Whereas political institutions once featured prominently in political analysis, today the focus is on political processes. And with the emphasis on political processes, a prominent role is now attributed to political actors. Correspondingly, a lively theorizing endeavour about the role of political actors has ensued. There now exists in the Political Science and kindred social science disciplines an impressive accumulation of literature dealing with the role of decision-makers or political actors.³ One area of these theoretical efforts is the social-psychological dimension. In this realm, the interest of social scientists is directed at exposing the linkages between the belief system of decision-makers and their political behaviour.

²For a lively and comprehensive review of the Behavioural Revolution, see: Klaus Knorr, and James N. Rosenau, (Eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969). Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach to Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest", American Political Science Review, Vol. LV (December, 1961), pp. 753-772.

³Robert D. Putnam's recent book, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976), contains an impressive bibliography of works on political elites and related topics. See pp. 215-242.

The study of political leadership provides an interesting commentary on the state of the discipline of Political Science. On the one hand, there is a group of political scientists who contend that theory construction demands a sense of parsimony. Incorporating cognitive or belief system perspective in our efforts at constructing theories is, according to these political scientists, without commensurate benefit because: (1) the impact of beliefs is largely muted by the constraints operative in the internal and external economic, social, political and physical milieu; (2) personality "cancels out" and can therefore be ignored by political analysts; (3) individual's social characteristics are more important in influencing their behaviour than their personality characteristics; and (4) under common situations, people with varying personalities will tend to behave similarly. Thus it is not useful to study personality variations if they exert little or no influence on behaviour.⁴

On the other hand, proponents of belief system perspective maintain that the beliefs of political actors influence decisions in so many important ways that the

⁴Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago, Illinois: Markham Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 33-40. Although Greenstein's discussion is mainly focused on the influence of personality on behaviour, the arguments advanced are equally applicable to the belief system since it is an integral component of an individual's personality structure.

incorporation of belief system or cognitive perspective into our theoretical schemes is warranted. They contend that the beliefs, or more broadly the personality of political actors, exert considerable impact on decisions under the following circumstances: (1) nonroutine situations that require more than merely the application of standard procedures and decision rules; (2) decisions made at the top of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from bureaucratic constraints; (3) long-range policy planning, a task in which values play a significant role; (4) situations that are highly ambiguous and open to varying interpretations; and (5) unanticipated events in which initial reactions are apt to reflect "cognitive sets".⁵

In attempts to assess the contending claims of the opponents and proponents of belief system perspective, political actors of the Third World provide excellent subjects for analysis. If the beliefs of decision-makers have significant influence on policy, such is more likely to surface in the decision-making behaviour of Third World leaders. This is because the decision-making situations characteristic of the Third World Countries closely approximate situations opponents and proponents of the belief system perspective have singled out in support of their contending

⁵A more comprehensive treatment of these issues is found in Greenstein. See Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 40-62, and Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively", in Robert Axelrod (ed.) Structure of Decision (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 18-33.

claims. Unlike political leaders of the Western World, the leaders of Africa, Asia, Latin America and other Third World Countries exercise greater control over the policies of their states. Of African leaders in particular, Olajide Aluko has noted:

Being new within the international system, most African states are still to carve out for themselves established interests in the international arena. Consequently there is nothing like the traditional patterns of external behaviour as one finds in the older established states. Furthermore, there are no serious domestic institutional restraints on the behaviour of African states....⁶

In addition to the above factors, the suitability of leaders of Developing Countries also derives from the fact that they stay longer in power than their Western counterparts. The longer a leader wields power, the greater the likelihood of his beliefs exerting prominent influence on his country's policy. The selection of President Kaunda for our study is relevant in this context. For more than fifteen years since independence, Zambia has been under the leadership of President Kaunda; a time-span long enough to facilitate a reliable assessment of the impact of his beliefs on the policies of Zambia.

⁶Olajide Aluko, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States", in Olajide Aluko (ed.) The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1976), p. 10. See also Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. Revised edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 261-75.

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In spite of the lack of consensus highlighted in the previous discussion on whether or not beliefs should be incorporated in our analysis, it is generally theorized that the beliefs of decision-makers determine or influence their decisions and policies. As Kenneth Boulding puts it succinctly, "...the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour".⁷ And since what we think the world is like is a function of our belief system,⁸ the belief systems of decision-makers become crucial in our attempts to understand, and hopefully predict, the policies - both domestic and foreign - of states. In a study of the 1914 crisis, Holsti, et al., concluded that "the manner in which one party... perceived the actions of the other party, was the crucial link

⁷Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International System", in Rosenau, James N. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, p. 423. There is a considerable degree of unanimity on this point among social scientists studying the impact of beliefs on policy. See also: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 28; Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in Singer, J. David (ed.) Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 128-9; David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago, Illionos: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 30; Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), p. 31; and Karl E. Scheibe, Beliefs and Values (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1970), p. 3.

⁸Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study", in Rosenau, James N. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, p. 544.

between perception and action".⁹ More recently, Stephen Walker has also demonstrated connections between Henry Kissinger's operational code and American foreign policy behaviour. Walker concluded, among other things, that "the congruency between this (Kissinger's) code and his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations implies that a knowledge of Kissinger's operational code is a necessary condition for the explanation of his behaviour".¹⁰ While these and other studies have demonstrated to some degree the impact of beliefs on decisions, the nexus between the two variables has not always been clearly explicated. Before examining these linkages, let us examine the concept of belief system.

A great deal of confusion has been introduced into the literature by the loose usage of such psychological concepts as belief system, beliefs, images, perceptions, attitudes, values and opinions. While it is recognized that these are closely linked to each other and, to a certain extent synonymous,¹¹ confusion ensues when they are used as both synonymous and different concepts at the same time with-

⁹Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North and Richard L. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in Singer, J. David (ed.), Quantitative Politics: Insights and Evidence, p. 158.

¹⁰Stephen G. Walker, "The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and The Vietnam War", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1977), p. 155.

¹¹Herbert C. Kelman, "Social Psychological Approach to the Study of International Relations", in Kelman, Herbert C. (ed.), International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 26.

but specifying what usage is intended. For purpose of this study, "beliefs" and "images"¹² will be used as synonymous concepts and the totality of these and other belief-related concepts as the belief system.

The belief system has been defined as:

...the total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world, and the self.¹³

¹²The literature suggests that "belief" is a broader concept than "images". In fact, concepts such as images, attitudes, opinions, values are all subsumed within the broader concept of beliefs. Herbert Kelman defines the term "image" as "the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system", a concept, he maintains, is broadly representative of the whole family of attitudinal variables. See Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approach to the Study of International Relations", in Kelman, Herbert (ed.), International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, pp. 24-6.

¹³Milton Rokeach, "The Nature of Attitude" in Sills, David L., (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (U.S.A.: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), p. 454. Cf. the following definitions: "The belief system, which is composed of a number of images of the past, present and future, includes 'all the accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world'." David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics, p. 29. "Psychological reality" or belief system refers to "the sum total of beliefs - existential and historical, relational, abstract and concrete, expectational and historical, self-oriented and other-oriented" Karl E. Scheibe, Beliefs and Values (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 34; Converse defines a "belief system as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence". Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief System in Mass Publics", in apter, David E. (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 207. Note that Converse has introduced an additional element in his definition - the condition of functional interdependence. We shall take up this issue in due course.

What then are beliefs? Karl Scheibe has defined beliefs as "fictions created to stand for an implicit property of a behaving person".¹⁴ Beliefs may be conceptualized as possessing three components: (1) a cognitive component, (2) an affective component, and (3) a behavioural component. The cognitive component of a belief represents a person's knowledge, held with varying degrees of certitude, about what is true or false, good or bad, desirable or undesirable. The affective component, on the other hand, refers to a belief's capability of arousing affect of varying intensity centering around: (a) the object of the belief, or (b) other objects - individuals or groups - taking a positive or negative position with regard to the object of the belief, or (c) the belief itself, when its validity is seriously questioned as occasioned in an argument. Since the belief is "a response predisposition of varying threshold", the behavioural component refers to the actions which ensue when it is suitably activated.¹⁵

Finlay, et al. have written that in a decision-making process, two factors are paramount: the end to be accomplished and the means to be used. While the process

¹⁴Karl E. Scheibe, Beliefs and Values, p. 22.

¹⁵Rokeach, "The Nature of Attitude" in Sills, David L. (ed.). International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 450.

includes logical and psychological, rational and irrational elements, theoretically the steps involved may be conceptualized as follows: (1) definition of the situation, (2) calculation and evaluation of alternatives, (3) choice or selection of alternatives and (4) implementation. On each of these stages, three considerations implicitly or explicitly influence the decision-making process: (1) what is desired, (2) what can be done, and (3) what must be done.¹⁶ All of these considerations are undoubtedly influenced by the belief system. Thus the influence of the belief system can be analyzed in terms of its direct and indirect relationships to decision-making. The direct relationship is the role the belief system plays in influencing the definition of goals and ordering of preferences. The second relationship operates in the area of perceptions and other cognitive processes.¹⁷ Beliefs, in the direct relationship are often treated as an independent variable while in the indirect relationship beliefs are treated as intervening variables. But as Holsti advised:

It is not very fruitful to assume direct linkages between beliefs and actions in foreign policy [or policy making in general], because the role that beliefs may play in policy making is much more subtle and less direct. Rather than acting as direct guides to action, they form one of several

¹⁶David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics, pp. 13-4.

¹⁷See Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study", in Rosenau, James H. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, p. 544; Finlay, et al., Enemies in Politics, p. 30.

clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision-making behaviour.¹⁸

We will therefore focus on the impact of the belief system as an intervening variable.

de Rivera has aptly described the influence of the belief-system on decision-making thus: "beliefs determine our reality by dictating the selection of one of a number of possible interpretations of the stimulus".¹⁹ Broadly conceived, as noted earlier, the impact of belief system may be conceptualized as mediated through the perceptive and cognitive processes. By "perception", we mean "the process by which decision-makers detect and assign meaning to inputs from their environment and formulate their own purposes or intents".²⁰ "Cognitive processes", on the other hand, refers to "various activities associated with problem solving (broadly conceived), including perception, appraisal, interpretation, search, information processing, strategies for coping with uncertainty, decision rules, verification and the like".²¹ Figure 1 below, attempts to depict the conceptual linkages between belief system and decision. As

¹⁸Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively", in Axelrod, Robert (ed.) Structure of Decision, p. 34.

¹⁹de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, p. 35.

²⁰Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in Singer, J. David (ed.) Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, p. 128.

²¹Holsti, "Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively", in Axelrod, Robert (ed.) Structure of Decision, p. 20.

shown in the diagram, there are three clustered variables, corresponding to the independent, intervening and dependent variables in decision-making process. The independent variable cluster consists of all inputs from the social, economic, political and physical environment perceived as information by decision-makers. The intervening variable cluster is made up of two components: the belief system and the cognitive process. Lastly, the dependent variable cluster - political behaviour - consists of the decision, policy action and policy output.




Figure 1* A Conceptual Model of the Linkages Between Belief System and Political Behaviour.

*For some of the ideas in Figure 1, above, see Ibid., p. 34 and Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study", in Rosenau, James H. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 545.

The broken arrows in the diagram symbolize the incoming information from the environment, perception of which is influenced by the belief system. This influence of the belief system in the perception of inputs is depicted by the passage of the arrows (information) through the belief system to the cognitive process. The "filtered-information" is then diagnosed, analysed and a response prescribed. The prescription becomes a decision when enacted and the decision in turn provides the basis for policy action. The arrow from the prescription stage to the decision indicates the indirect linkage between beliefs and decisions. The arrow from the belief system to the decision depicts the direct relationship between the two variables. The value component of the belief system prescribes goals which may lead directly to certain decisions without the mediation of the cognitive processes.

A diagrammatic representation of any process inevitably gives a static impression. It must be emphasized that the processes Figure 1 attempts to portray are dynamic rather than static. This fact is underscored by the arrows inter-connecting the various variable clusters, and components within clusters. The two-headed arrows signify the reciprocal influences among the cognitive processes. The arrow from the policy output to the belief system symbolizes a feed-back mechanism. Through this the belief system is in turn influenced by the policy output.

Various approaches to the study of political phenomena attempt to incorporate, explicitly or implicitly, the

role of decision-makers and their belief system in the analyses. While it would be intellectually rewarding to review all of these, time and space permit only the two approaches most pertinent to the present study. We now turn, therefore, to a review of the decision-making and operational code approaches.

Approaches in the Study of Decision-Makers and Their Belief System: Decision-Making and the "Operational Code" Approach

In 1954, Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin introduced what is generally referred to as the Decision-making Approach into the discipline of Political Science. Introduced into the discipline through the fields of Foreign Policy and International Politics, the approach has since been closely associated with these two fields. In a fundamental sense, the Decision-making Approach is not a new form of analysis; scholars have always analyzed decisions. What is new in the work of Snyder, et al. is the explicitness with which certain assumptions, conceptual variables, categories and subcategories were organized into an analytical framework. For our present purpose, a synopsis of the basic elements of the approach will suffice.

Central to the original decision-making framework developed by Snyder and associates is the simple notion that "state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-

makers".²² In other words the abstraction referred to as the "policies of states" is essentially the decisions of those concrete individuals entrusted with the affairs of states. Thus to comprehend the "policies of states", the political actions of these individuals must be analyzed in terms of the context in which the actions were undertaken. To facilitate the reconstruction of the world of decision-makers, Snyder proposed that we analyze the activities of decision-makers in terms of one main form of behaviour: the decision to pursue one course of action among the many options available. Since the actions of decision-makers proceed on the basis of prior choices, he argues that these "decision-making activities at the core of all political action provide a common focus for the analysis of otherwise disparate political actors, situations, and processes".²³

The world of decision-makers in Snyder's framework is composed of stimuli from (1) the internal setting of decision-making, (2) the external setting of decision-making and (3) the decision-making process. These three clustered categories are composed of numerous subcategories.

²²Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 55.

²³James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis", in Charlesworth, James C. (ed.) Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 195. See also Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 66-8.

The internal setting is conceived as subsuming such fundamental categories as "major common-value orientations, major characteristics of social organization, group structures and function, major institutional patterns, basic social process...and social differentiation and specialization".²⁴

The external setting is conceived to embrace "the actions and reactions of other states (their decision-makers), the societies for which they act, and the physical world".²⁵

Lastly, the decision-making process setting is conceived as composed of three main subcategories. These are (a) spheres of competence, (b) communication and information, and (c) motivation. Each of these subcategories are further subdivided into various components.²⁶

Even though it is more than a decade since the framework was developed by Snyder and associates, the revolutionary nature of the proposals advanced by the decision-making approach in a discipline accustomed to the habit of anthropomorphizing states can still be appreciated. Not only were many of the fundamental premises of the prevailing modes of analyzing international politics and foreign policy challenged, but, far more important for the development of

²⁴Richard C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena" in Young, Roland (ed.) Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 22.

²⁵Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, p. 57.

²⁶Loc. cit.

the discipline, explicit and systematic analysis was fostered.

Notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm generated by the decision-making approach's innovative insights, it has largely failed to generate empirical case studies. One of the reasons the approach has not been widely utilized in empirical studies is its all-inclusive nature, a condition which has rendered it almost unmanageable. As Sullivan has noted, rather than providing a useful tool for reducing the complexity of decision-making processes in order to compare them, the Snyder model requires the retention of almost all of the original historical data.²⁷ Another weakness of the Snyder model is its lack of theorizing about the linkages or relationships among the categories and subcategories. In Rosenau's words, "the difficulty with all the categories and subcategories subsumed by the approach is not that they have been proliferated, but rather they have been isolated from each other".²⁸

Variants of the decision-making approach have been developed since Snyder's framework. In an article published in 1969,²⁹ the basic ideas of which were later incorporated

²⁷Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 69.

²⁸Rosenau, "Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis" in Charlesworth, James C. (ed.). Contemporary Political Analysis, p. 208.

²⁹Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Model and the Cuban Missile Crisis", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII No. 8 (September, 1969).

into a larger study, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison demonstrated that what is generally referred to as the decision-making approach or model is in fact three models. These he labelled (1) the Rational Actor Model, (2) Organizational Process Model, and (3) Governmental (Bureaucratic) Model.

The Rational Actor Model, Allison has written, is the prevalent model in foreign policy analysis. In essence its dominant inference pattern is that if a nation performed a particular action it must have ends to which the action constitutes a maximizing means. A nation's actions can thus be explained by isolating the purposive pattern within which the occurrence can be located as a value-maximizing means.³⁰

Whereas the Rational Actor Model posits that a nation's actions emanate from a goal maximization strategy, the Organizational Process Model asserts that a states' policy is more the aggregate "outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior" than deliberate choices. Hence explaining national action, according to the Organizational Process Model, is uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires that produced the outputs comprising the national action.³¹

Lastly, in contrast to the last two models, the

³⁰Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 33.

³¹Ibid., pp. 67-88.

Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model posits that governmental or state behaviour can be explained by conceptualizing it as the results of bargaining games. It further advances that the "leaders" of various governmental departments and agencies are not a monolithic group and that they are best conceived of as independent players engaged in a competitive game. Since, according to the Governmental Model, state behaviour is the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government, national action is explained by displaying the game that constitutes the action. Essentially, the task of displaying the game involves identifying the action-channel, the positions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling.³²

The "Operational Code" Approach

Fundamentally, the operational code approach may be conceived of as an extension of the Decision-Making Approach. This fact is attested to by the perspective that attributes a crucial role to the individual - the concrete decision-maker. In a sense, the operational code approach is an attempt at understanding one of the crucial decision-making variables, the decision-maker.

The operational code approach has been popularized by Alexander George's reformulation of Nathan Leites study

³²Ibid., pp. 144-73.

of the Bolshevik operational code.³³ The name operational code is a misnomer in the sense that "it implies, incorrectly, a set of recipes or repertoires for political action that an elite applies mechanically in its decision-making".³⁴ Is generally conceived, the operational code refers to a decision-maker's general beliefs about "fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics" as these relate to the problem of action.³⁴

The George construct comprises ten belief categories divided into five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs.³⁵ The philosophical belief categories essentially deal with the assumptions and premises of decision-makers regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of conflict and the role of the individual in history. The instrumental belief categories, on the other hand, refer to beliefs about "ends-means relationship, in the context of political action".³⁶ A brief review of the belief categories in the George construct seems appropriate.

³³Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972).

³⁴Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly XIII, (June, 1969), p. 166.

³⁵Ole Holsti, who has done extensive work in this area of research, has developed a modified version of the George construct. In the Holsti's Version, philosophical belief categories 3 and 5 have been combined into a single category. Furthermore, the Holsti's version outlines some of the questions subsumed under the various belief categories.

³⁶George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 172.

Philosophical Beliefs

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

The above belief category deals with a political actor's beliefs regarding the essential nature of political life, beliefs assumed to be significantly influenced by an actor's perception of his political opponents. It is also assumed here that an actor's beliefs regarding the nature of political life, particularly the harmonious - conflictual dichotomy of the political universe, is contingent upon his reading of human nature and history. Thus political elites who see human nature as basically selfish and evil are apt to attribute a malevolent character to political opponents and define the political universe and the nature of political life as essentially conflictual.³⁷

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

Clearly this belief category deals with a political actor's general disposition towards political action. And subsumed under this category are such questions as: (a) the nature of the political actor's fundamental goals; (b) the political actor's optimism or pessimism about long term

³⁷For further explication of the content of this philosophical belief category, see George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 174.

goals, and about specific undertakings; (c) whether the political actor's optimism or pessimism is conditional; (d) whether the political actor sees time to be on his side or not.³⁸ It is generally postulated that political actors who are optimistic are cautious and calculating in their pursuit of goals: This is because optimism based on a belief in eventual success exercises a moderating influence by inhibiting radical undertakings. Conversely, actors who are pessimistic are, it is posited, apt to pursue radical and desperate measures.³⁹

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

The questions of predictability-unpredictability posed here are intimately related to political actors' position on the "determinist-indeterminist" dichotomy of historical development. Essentially, this belief category seeks to determine: (a) whether a political actor views political life as capricious or as conforming to a more or less discernible pattern; (b) what degree of predicability he believes exists in political life; (d) what aspects of

³⁸These questions were outlined on Ole Holsti's version of the Operational Code construct. See also George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly XIII (June, 1969), p. 175.

³⁹George "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 175; Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. III (March, 1970), pp. 136-7.

political life he deems predictable or unpredictable.⁴⁰ It is believed that political actors with a "determinist" perspective tend to see the political future as predictable while those with "indeterminist" perspective tend towards the contrary.

4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?

The essence of this belief category is to determine a political actor's assessment of the general leadership role in influencing the course of historical development. Pertinent questions here include: (a) whether the political actor sees himself as either capable or incapable of controlling and directing those actions and events which shape the affairs of men; (b) whether the political actor sees himself as either capable or incapable of controlling such events and actions towards desired goals. There is an assumption here that political actors confident about their capabilities in moving events towards desired goals are likely to be dynamic while those who believe the contrary are likely to be passive.⁴¹

⁴⁰George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 175.

⁴¹See George's and Holsti's discussions of the Bolshevik's and Dulles' beliefs of this category respectively. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 176; and Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", pp. 139-40.

5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and historical development?

The operative word in this belief category is "chance". Two related meanings have been attributed to this word. The first of these refers to fortuitous events - events which are purely accidental and are deemed to be beyond the control of man. The second meaning refers to mistakes or miscalculations, that is, events stemming from mistaken or incorrect forecasting.⁴² The focus of this category is on whether a political actor sees human affairs and historical development as largely the product of chance in the sense of accident or miscalculation emanating from conscious decisions, or as largely one in which "chance" has no influence.

The five philosophical belief categories briefly reviewed above are closely interrelated to each other and are in turn interrelated to the five instrumental belief categories. We shall discuss some of the implications of this attribute of the construct in the concluding chapter.

Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

This belief category seeks to extract beliefs which relate to questions of how political goals should be

⁴²See George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 176; and Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", pp. 139-40.

established. Relevant here are such questions as the principles which influence the selection of goals to be pursued. Also subsumed under this category are issues relating to the goals for which political actions are undertaken and the manner in which value conflicts are resolved. For instance, this category attempts to determine whether a political actor believes in pursuing optimal or satisfactory goals. It is generally posited that political actors who believe in the pursuit of optimal goals are usually very calculating and systematic as regards strategies and tactics.⁴³

2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

The primary focus in this category is on tactics. It is intended to reveal the tactics political actors consider to be most effective for the achievement of goals. Some relevant questions under this category are: (a) under what circumstances does a political actor think it is permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon a goal? (b) under what circumstances does a political actor think he should push harder, be prepared to compromise, or retreat from a

⁴³George's analysis of the Bolshevik approach for selecting goals for political action provides insightful clues regarding the relevant issues this dimension seeks to decipher. George "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", pp. 177-81. See also Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", pp. 140-42.

previously-held position? (c) under what circumstances does a political actor think unilateral action or multilateral action is preferred?⁴⁴

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?

This dimension also deals with beliefs pertinent to strategy and tactics in the pursuit of goals. Risk refers to the degree of uncertainty of outcome political actors are willing to accept in their pursuit of goals. Evidently, the calculation and acceptance of risks cannot be separated from the value political actors attach to their goals. It seems logical that the more important the values attached to a goal, the greater the propensity for risk-taking in pursuit of that goal. Furthermore, the degree of control a political actor can exert over political risks is in part dependent on the nature of his political opponents.⁴⁵

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

This belief category is also related to strategy and tactics. However, the focus of interest here is the importance political actors attribute to the timing of actions in pursuit of goals. For example, Bolshevik and Dulles' beliefs in this category call for the exertion of pressure and the pursuit of a hard-nose policy when the

⁴⁴These questions are identified in the Holsti's version of the Operational Code construct.

⁴⁵George "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", pp. 182-85.

enemy is in a weak position.⁴⁶

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

This is the normative category in the Operational Code construct. The essence here is to isolate the degree of "pragmatism" in the operational code belief system of political actors. For some political actors, the "end justifies the means" and therefore any and every action capable of producing the desired goal is an appropriate means regardless of its ethical character. On the other hand, political actors who adhere to strict ethical norms are apt to assess political action on the basis of its moral rectitude.⁴⁷

Alexander George suggested that a political actor's operational code belief system can be derived from his writings. Accordingly, the primary source of data for this study is President Kaunda's books and speeches. These comprise about eight books and sixty speeches. Most of the speeches are published in booklet form and some of the books are compilation of his earlier speeches. None of these, however, include writings before he entered politics. In fact, our data only covers the time span since 1960.

⁴⁶Loc. cit.

⁴⁷See Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", pp. 150-52; and George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", pp. 189-90.

The data was derived by qualitatively content analysing all Kaunda's books and speeches. The recording unit is the theme subsumed under the ten belief categories discussed in the previous section. There is considerable debate over the validity of inference associated with the technique of qualitative content analysis. The crux of the issue in this debate centers around alternative models of communication - the representational and the instrumental models. The representational model posits that verbal expressions are valid indicators of the communicator's beliefs, motivations and other psychological attributes. In contrast, the instrumental model contends that words may be chosen to have certain impact on the target of the communication, in which case they are not necessarily valid indicators of the communicator's beliefs and motivations.⁴⁸ The implications of these issues for our study will be explored in the concluding chapter.

The main findings of our study are presented in Chapter Three - The Operational Code Belief System of President Kenneth Kaunda, and Chapter Four - Analysis and Conclusion. But before these, a short biographical review of President Kaunda in Chapter Two provides a necessary introduction to the subject of our study.

⁴⁸See Alexander George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis", in Pool, Ithiel de Sola (ed.), Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959).

CHAPTER II

PRESIDENT KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA: A BIOGRAPHY

President Kaunda was born in 1924 at Lubwa in the Chinsali District of the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia, renamed Zambia since 1964. Named Buchizya, the "unexpected one", because he was born in the twentieth year of his parents' marriage, President Kaunda was the eighth in the line of children born to David Kaunda and Helen Nyirenda. His father, David Kaunda, was the first African missionary sent by the Livingstonia Mission of Nyasaland (now Malawi) in 1904 to the Bemba people of the Chinsali District of Northern Rhodesia.¹

Zambia is a land-locked state in Central Africa. It is bordered, reading clockwise from North, by Zaire, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, Botswana and South-West Africa or Namibia and Angola. As a geographical unit, Zambia, like most African states, is the product of the European partition of Africa. Until 1889 when the British Government granted a charter to Rhodes' British South Africa Company, an arrangement which allowed Rhodes'

¹This biography of President Kaunda is based mainly on: Kenneth D. Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free: An Autobiography (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1962); John Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1976); and Fergus Macpherson, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and The Man (Lusaka, Zambia: Oxford University Press, 1974).

company to acquire mineral concessions from the kings and chiefs of the various ethnic or tribal groups of the area, what is today known as Zambia was a collection of small kingdoms and chieftaincies. By 1899, through treaties with European powers and various tribal groups, British rule had been imposed on Northern Rhodesia with Rhodes' chartered company administering the area. By 1924, the British Government took over the administration of Northern Rhodesia.²

The history of Zambia has been significantly shaped by the opening up of the Copperbelt in 1928. Under company rule there was small scale mining. But Northern Rhodesia's economic importance then was mainly as a source of African labour to the mines in the South and Katanga. With the development of the Copperbelt came a large influx of Europeans. Before then there were few European settlers in Northern Rhodesia. The coming of the Europeans injected a different dimension into Northern Rhodesia's struggle for independence.³ In contrast to the independence struggles of most colonial territories, the struggle for independence in Northern Rhodesia entailed two seemingly contradictory phases. The first phase involved the abolition of a semi-autonomous federation for the resumption of full Colonial Office rule. Federation, representing as it did the power of

²See Roberts, A History of Zambia; and Richard Hall, Zambia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

³Loc. cit.

European settlers, was seen by African nationalists as an obstacle to their aspirations for eventual independence. With the Federation of Central Africa abolished, the second phase then became independence from Britain.⁴ The history of this struggle is largely the history of Kenneth Kaunda, first President of the Independent Republic of Zambia.

Young Kaunda grew up in the mission surroundings at Lubwa in an atmosphere of Christian and traditional African values. His parents combined the work of the ministry and farming. So generous were his parents that in time their home became known as Galilee - "the place of peace and rest". When Kaunda was eight his father died. The death of his father introduced a degree of hardship into the Kaunda family and made it necessary that the children help their mother in keeping house and home together.⁵

Kaunda started school early relative to most African children during this time. Except for two years at Munalu Secondary School, he acquired most of his formal education at the Lubwa Mission his father had founded. Kaunda had to struggle for his education. From the time he was promoted to Middle School - standards III, IV, V and VI - he had to work in the mission during holidays to earn his school fees of thirty shillings a year. At the completion of standard VI, Kaunda was accepted into the Lubwa Normal Training

⁴Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, pp. 51-52.

⁵Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, pp. 5-11.

Course for teachers. Here he was trained as a teacher for two years. But instead of becoming a teacher at the completion of his training, he was in 1941 chosen along with twenty-nine other boys from all over Northern Rhodesia to attend that territory's first secondary school at Munali in Lusaka. Kaunda's school days at Munali ended after only two years. Even though he had passed his form II examinations and was chosen to proceed to forms III and IV, he was summoned by the missionaries at Lubwa because teachers were desperately needed.⁶

Back at Lubwa, Kaunda was appointed boarding master of the Lubwa school for boys. For four years, he taught at Lubwa. In addition to teaching, he was also involved with his pack of "trekkers" and the Chinsali African Welfare Association. The name "trekkers" was given to African boys because "cub" was reserved for European boys. It was also during this time that he married Betty Banda.⁷

In spite of the comfort of home and family, and the security and joy of being a teacher, Kaunda was restless. He had a yearning to break away from the pattern of life his mother and the mission had planned for him. This yearning sent him to Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia) and the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia (now

⁶Ibid., pp. 12-18.

⁷Ibid., pp. 18-23.

the Copperbelt Province of Zambia) in search of a job. In the Copperbelt, Kaunda first worked as a Welfare Assistant at the Mchanga mine. Next, he secured a job as boarding master at Mufulira. By this time his wife, Betty, and his first child, Panji Tushuke, had joined him.⁸

Besides his teaching job and organizing some of his pupils into a self-help club, Kaunda became the Vice-Secretary of the local branch of the Northern Rhodesia Congress, formed in 1948. In addition to his membership in Congress, he was also the teachers' representative in the Urban Advisory Council. In 1949, Kaunda was elected to the Provincial council. It was here at Mufulira that Kaunda was first subjected to the indignities of colour bar. In Mufulira, as in many places where colour bar operated then, Africans were forbidden from entering stores operated by whites. Instead, they are served through holes on the sides of stores. Kaunda decided to challenge and expose this practice. The treatment to which he was subjected for entering a chemist store highlighted to Kaunda the realities of the then Northern Rhodesia and influenced his resolve to rid his people of the system which fostered such iniquities.⁹

It is difficult to date precisely Kaunda's entry into politics. As boarding master at Lubwa from about 1943-47, Kaunda was an active member of the Chinsali African Welfare

⁸Ibid., pp. 23-30.

⁹Ibid., pp. 30-36.

Association. For those who treat these associations as the fore-runners of national political parties in Northern Rhodesia, Kaunda's political life dated from this period. Others have dated his political life from his brief sojourn in Mufulira.

By the late 1940s politics in Northern Rhodesia had taken a national dimension for Africans. Prior to this time, the various overlapping councils and associations, perhaps with the exception of the African Representative Council, were mainly concerned with social problems of immediate interest to the areas in which these institutions and organizations were based. By 1949, the issues of amalgamation and later federation propelled Africans into national politics. To most Africans, federation was an evil that must be vehemently and relentlessly opposed. Specifically, Kaunda and his political associates perceived federation as a device through which White supremacy could be entrenched and perpetuated in Northern Rhodesia. In addition, federation was also seen by Africans as a vehicle for the introduction into Northern Rhodesia of Southern Rhodesia's blatant and vicious racial discrimination laws.¹⁰

On his return to Lubwa in late 1949, Kaunda contacted the General Secretary of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, Robinson Mabulyato, for permission to open a branch

¹⁰Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, p. 62.

of Congress in Chinsali. Northern Rhodesia African Congress (first named Northern Rhodesia Congress) was a political body formed in 1948 from the Federation of African Welfare Societies. The main exponent of the congress idea was Dauti Yamba. With authority from Congress' General Secretary and the consent of his friends, Makasa and Sokoni, the idea of a Chinsali Branch of Congress was introduced to the Chinsali African Welfare Association.¹¹

In March, 1951, Kaunda, Makasa and Simon Sula were elected as secretary, chairman and treasurer of the Chinsali Branch of Northern Rhodesia African Congress, respectively. From 1951-52, Kaunda and his political associates diligently went about organizing the District of Chinsali. Their political message to the people of Chinsali was simple but effective. Its main thrust was the treatment of Africans as inferior human beings by Whites and the presentation of Congress as the only organisation which could redress the injustices inflicted on the African people.¹²

Perhaps as a result of the dedication he had demonstrated in organizing the Chinsali Branch of Congress, Kaunda was appointed Organising Secretary for the Northern Province in 1952. In the previous year, Harry Nkumbula had succeeded Mbikusita as President of Congress. With his bicycle, his only means of transportation, Kaunda travelled the length

¹¹Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, p. 40.

¹²Ibid., pp. 40-51.

and breadth of the Northern Province meeting chiefs, village headmen, teachers, traders, farmers, clerks and ordinary people. He would open up branches of Congress wherever possible. At times he would be away for months. So absorbed was Kaunda in organizing the Northern Province that his wife, mother and sister started doubting the motives behind his long absence from home. By this time he could hardly spare any time for farming or anything else.¹³

Kaunda's profound dedication to the nationalist movement was quickly recognized by his political associates. In August, 1953, he was elected Secretary-General of the African National Congress (the name had been changed from Northern Rhodesia African Congress to African National Congress (ANC) under the leadership of Harry Nkumbula). The duties of Secretary-General necessitated that he move to Lusaka, the administrative capital of Northern Rhodesia. In Lusaka, the only accommodation immediately available to the Kaunda family was Congress' office. This consisted of two small office rooms and a tiny kitchen. During the day it was occupied by typists, clerks and visitors and at night it became the Kaunda's home. When in 1954 the Kaundas secured a more spacious house, its roof leaked so badly that it was almost impossible to sleep in it during the rainy season.¹⁴

¹³Ibid., pp. 52-4.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 55-59.

In retrospect the election of a person of Kaunda's drive, determination and dedication to the important position of Secretary-General of Congress was a watershed in the development of African nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia. On August 1st, 1953, the Federation of Central Africa legally came into force in spite of the vehement opposition mounted against it through Congress. There was a profound sense of failure and to many there was no longer any need for Congress. Perhaps Kaunda more than anyone else sensed this feeling of hopelessness among Africans. To revitalize the nationalist movement, Congress launched a five-year plan.¹⁵

In his capacity as Secretary-General, Kaunda had long realized the need for a Congress newspaper. In late 1953, the National Executive Council of Congress decided to start publishing a newspaper. Towards this end, an editorial board made up of Titus Mukupo, W. K. Sikalumbi and Kaunda was formed. Due to the cost of printing, a cyclostyled monthly paper titled, Congress News, was published instead. The first issue of Congress News appeared in October 1953 and shortly after the second issue in November, Kaunda and Nkumbula were arrested for printing a newspaper without registering it. However, the Criminal Investigation Headquarters discovered that the Postmaster General had informed

¹⁵Ibid., p. 60; Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, p. 72.

Congress officials that Congress News could not be registered because it was not printed. Thus Kaunda and Nkumbula were released.¹⁶

In early 1955, Kaunda and Nkumbula were sentenced to two months imprisonment with hard labour for the discovery of prohibited literature in Congress' office. The literature in question was copies of a magazine, Africa and the Colonial World, which Congress was receiving from a member of the British Parliament in London. Until Congress' statement on the Gwembe disturbance was published in this magazine, its circulation in Northern Rhodesia was lawful. Thereafter it was banned. But Kaunda in his capacity as Secretary-General had forgotten to dispose of the collection of Africa and the Colonial World in Congress' office.¹⁷

With federation imposed, Congress officials were constantly harassed. In addition to the imprisonment of Kaunda, the Secretary-General, and Nkumbula, the President, a number of organizers in the provinces were also jailed for various offences. But in spite of the government's harassment, Kaunda was relentless in his determination and efforts at organizing and agitating against the Federation of Central Africa.

In 1957, Kaunda and Nkumbula visited the United Kingdom on the invitation of the British Labour Party. The

¹⁶Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, p. 62.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 63-70.

trip to the United Kingdom added immensely to Kaunda's political skills and strengthened his suspicion as to the seriousness of Nkumbula's commitment to the nationalist movement. Nkumbula and Kaunda had arranged a meeting with the Colonial Secretary. Two days before the meeting, Nkumbula flew home despite Kaunda's protestation and attempts at impressing on him the importance of meeting the Colonial Secretary. To Kaunda this display of Nkumbula was an utter dereliction of responsibilities.¹⁸

Kaunda returned to Northern Rhodesia after a six-month sojourn in London. In 1958, he visited Tanganyika and then India. On his return from India, it became apparent to him and others that Nkumbula lacked the requisite leadership qualities for the long nationalist struggle ahead. Hence they broke away from the ANC under the leadership of Nkumbula and in October, 1958, Kaunda and his political associates formed a new political party named Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). In the inaugural meeting of ZANC held at Broken Hill (now Kabwe), Kaunda was elected President while Kapwepwe and Sipalo were elected Treasurer-General and Secretary-General, respectively. The new party started with virtually nothing. So it was back to using Kaunda's home in Chilenje as the party's office in spite of the fact that Betty Kaunda was expecting their sixth child. In the

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 80-88; Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, pp. 83-88.

circumstances ZANC was faced with two immediate tasks. First Kaunda and his ZANC associates had to recruit those they had recruited before for ANC. This task involved convincing the people that the split with ANC was due to policy disagreement rather than personality conflict, and organizing branches all over the territory. The second task was organizing a boycott of the impending elections under the Benson Constitution.¹⁹

While ZANC was actively pursuing these ends, Kaunda had to travel to Ghana for the All-African People's Conference convened in Accra by Nkrumah. At the Conference, Kaunda met and discussed the problems of his country with many other delegates from various parts of Africa. After the conference he stayed in Ghana for a month attending an extra-mural school at Legon and observing how the country was administered. He also visited neighbouring Togoland during this time. After a month in Ghana, Kaunda returned to Northern Rhodesia more committed to the struggle than ever.²⁰

By this time the political tempo in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was in high gear. So tense was the situation in Central Africa that in February, 1959, a state of emergency was declared in Southern Rhodesia and a few days later in Nyasaland. ZANC's growing popularity was perceived as a

¹⁹Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, pp. 88-104.

²⁰Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, pp. 153-4.

threat by the government. Hence on March 1st, 1959, Kaunda and many other prominent leaders of ZANC were arrested and detained in various parts of Northern Rhodesia. Kuanda was at first detained in Kabompo in the North Western Province of Northern Rhodesia. While in Kabompo, he was rearrested and then sent to the Central Prison in Lusaka. After spending some time at this prison, he was suddenly transferred to the Central Prison in Salisbury. Then in December 15th, 1959, Kaunda was sent back to the Central Prison in Lusaka. On January 9th, 1960, he was released from prison.²¹

During Kaunda's stay in detention and then prison, events in Northern Rhodesia were moving very fast. A new party, United National Independence Party (UNIP) had been formed in place of the banned ZANC. On January 31st, 1960, Kaunda was elected President of UNIP. Far from being disillusioned by the rigours of detention and imprisonment, Kaunda was resolute as ever. During this time he made a brief visit to the U.S.A. to raise funds. On his way back to Northern Rhodesia, he also visited London. In the midst of all these activities, the British Government appointed the Moncton Commission. When the Commission reported its findings, it noted the unanimous African opposition to the Federation of Central Africa. After this report it was evident the Federation was doomed. Towards the end of 1960,

²¹Ibid., pp. 154-5. Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, pp. 104-36.

Kaunda, Mkumbula and Katilungo of UNC, Banda of Nyasaland, and Nkomo from Southern Rhodesia were all in London to attend a conference on proposed constitutional changes and a review of the Federation.²²

By this time it was evident that the crucial area of negotiation was the proposed constitutional changes. The discussion on the issue of a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia was rather brief. The year 1961 was one of extreme anxiety for Kaunda. While it seemed apparent that Northern Rhodesia would soon be granted a constitution that would give Africans a majority, Sir Roy Welensky and his federalist associates were not willing to see the disintegration of the Federation. Partly as a result of the inordinate pressure on the British Government and partly as a result of the British Government's attempts at encouraging the growth of a centrist group between the rival African and European political groups, Iain Macleod, the then Colonial Secretary, vacillated on the issue of the new constitution for Northern Rhodesia. Various constitutional schemes were proposed. And during this tense suspense, disturbances broke out in the Northern Province.²³

Kaunda and the UNIP had to counter the pressure exerted on the British Government by the Federalists. There

²²Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, pp. 137-50.

²³Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, pp. 159-69.

was too much at stake to trust the welfare of the Africans in the hands of the British Government. Thus Kaunda intensified his campaign at home and visited London again to present the case of his people.²⁴

Towards the end of 1961, Reginald Maudling replaced Iain Macleod as Colonial Secretary. At the end of February, 1962, the British Government announced new constitutional provisions for Northern Rhodesia. Elections were held at the end of October under the new constitution. In December, UNIP under the leadership of Kaunda and ANC under Nkumbula's leadership formed a coalition. This gave the Africans a majority under the new constitution. On December 15th, 1962, a new government was announced for Northern Rhodesia, the ministers being Kaunda, Kapwepwe, Kananga, Nkumbula, Stubbs and C. E. Cousins and four civil servants. By the end of 1963, most of the vestiges of the Central African Federation had been abolished. In January, 1964, elections were held again under a new constitution. This time Kaunda's UNIP won a majority of the seats - 55 out of 75 seats. At a constitutional conference held at Marlborough House in May, final arrangements for Northern Rhodesia's independence were concluded. On October 24th, 1964, the state of Zambia was born with Kenneth D. Kaunda as its first President.²⁵ Born in 1924, the very year Northern Rhodesia was placed under

²⁴Loc. cit.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 168-9.

the administration of the Colonial Office, Kaunda had relentlessly led the struggle that had transformed Northern Rhodesia from a British colonial territory to the Independent Republic of Zambia.

CHAPTER III

THE "OPERATIONAL CODE" BELIEF SYSTEM OF PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA

Philosophical Beliefs

The Nature of Politics

Alexander George has written that a political actor's beliefs about the nature of politics are

shaped particularly by his orientation to other political actors. Most important of these are one's opponents. The way in which they are perceived - the characteristics the political actor attributes to his opponents - exercises a subtle influence on many other philosophical and instrumental beliefs in his operational code.¹

This statement may be entirely true about many political actors, but in the case of President Kaunda, his beliefs about the nature of politics seem to be influenced more profoundly by his beliefs about man than by his perception of the enemy.

Belief 1. Man is the highest symbol of God's creation.²

Belief 2. "The Human personality has certain weakness".³

President Kaunda is an avowed humanist. Consistent with Humanist philosophy, he believes that man is a spiritual

¹George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglect Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly, p. 174.

²Kenneth D. Kaunda, Dear Mr. Vorster...Details of Exchanges Between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. (Lusaka, Zambia: Zambia Information Services, 1971), p. 2.

³Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation Part II (Lusaka, Zambia: The Division of National Guidance, 1974), p. xiii.

being created in the image of God. Thus, "it is not possible to measure man against an ordinary animal".⁴ Nor is the individual's worth measureable by such criteria as efficiency, success, merit or status. He condemns the utilitarian valuation of man since man's mere presence in society is in itself a contribution to society and should be cherished as such. Moreover, a man's worth is not determined by the artificial criteria we have created, such as the colour of one's skin. "Whether a person was born black, white, green or blue...is for those of us who believe in the holy creation of man, the good Lord's divine performance".⁵

President Kaunda's beliefs about the value of man have not, however, made him oblivious to human nature. While he believes in the inherent goodness of people, he also acknowledges that man possesses certain weaknesses in his personality. Among these weaknesses are greed, laziness and selfishness. In his The "Watershed" Speech, he submits that "every man is born with an animal in him".⁶ It is this animal in man, called greed and defined as the elevation of one's interest above that of society, that causes man to exploit his fellowman. Thus, the existence of a free society

⁴Ibid., p. 127.

⁵Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection From His Writings. edited by Thomas Patrick Melady (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964), p. 203.

⁶Kaunda, The "Watershed" Speech. (Lusaka, Zambia: Zambia Information Services, 1975), p. 11.

in our world is inhibited by the aggressiveness and self-indulgence of human nature. Then he warned that "any leader who acted on the assumption that he was presiding over a colony of angels would get a rude shock".⁷ On balance, however, President Kaunda believes that "man is moving towards perfection" and that he is well endowed with such wonderful gifts as Godly love, spiritual and moral being, knowledge and wisdom.⁸

Belief 3. The Universe is basically good.

Belief 4. Greed and other evils are the causes of conflict in the world.

Belief 5. "...Man may bewail the fact of the power struggle but there is no way in which they can avoid taking part in it. There is no possibility of disengagement."⁹

Belief 6. "All politics is power politics."¹⁰

As man is the embodiment of both good and evil so is the political universe a composite of harmony and conflict. The nature of the political universe derives from the nature of man. On the one hand, "the universe is basically good and that through it great forces are at work striving to bring about a greater unity of all living things".¹¹ On the

⁷Kaunda, Letter to My Children (London: Longman, 1973), p. 39.

⁸Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. 127.

⁹Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 69.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 71.

¹¹Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin M. Morris From Kenneth D. Kaunda, Selected by Colin M. Morris (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 22.

other hand, power appeals to the weakness in man and hence the struggle for its possession among men.

For President Kaunda, the source of all power is God. Man lives by God's power and indeed dispenses some of it through his daily life. Thus, law, which Kaunda defined as "ordered power", is guaranteed by states, but derives its ultimate ordering from God. "The state is not the source of power; it merely mediates power derived from God".¹² This recognition that God is the ultimate source of power is evidenced in the religious affirmation of swearing-in ceremonies of Heads of States, Justices and other high officials in most states, he maintains.

Man cannot disengage from the struggle for power because he is the crown of God's creation and has dominion over all created things, including himself. Human society, President Kaunda believes, "is a vast pyramid of power; of domination and subordination".¹³ Hence man is constantly adjusting to power relationship, a process wrought with power struggle. It is the nature of power, he submits, which provokes the weakness in man and inevitably the struggle for its possession. One of power's irresistible attractions is the opportunity it affords its possessor to extend the range of his personality and fulfill himself through the

¹²Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 71.

¹³Kaunda, Humanism In Zambia Part II, p. 70.

personalities of others. Furthermore, "power enables men to multiply the impact of their personality on the world and other men. Hence it is often the source of pride and arrogance". Then he adds:

Because power works where persuasion or goodwill so often fail, it surrounds itself with an aura of prestige which adds to its value. It becomes desirable not only for what it is in itself and for what can be done with it, but also for the awe and respect it calls out from men. Power panders to a devilish pride because it makes men both dependent and worshipful.¹⁴

Belief 7. Man needs a structure of authority to establish a framework of order and justice.

Belief 8. "The state embodies man's suspicions, doubts and fears, as well as his hopes and aspirations...."¹⁵

President Kaunda traces the evolution of the modern state to the ancient village-state. Since man himself is imperfect, he contends, the state embodies both his (man's) goodness and weakness and is somewhat "authoritarian in nature"; a fact attested to by such institutions as the army, air force, navy, police force, prison service, civil service, political party and a host of others that regulate man's life. For President Kaunda "the state exists for man". Its existence is therefore warranted "only until he moves from the present state of imperfection of his body and soul, or his physical and spiritual being, to one of perfection and therefore moves further to a clearer understanding of God".¹⁶

¹⁴Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 72-3.

¹⁵Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. 14.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 15-6.

- Belief 9. "The time through which we are living could well be termed the century of power...."¹⁷
- Belief 10. "There is no spot on the globe devoid of difficulty and even danger in these times."¹⁸
- Belief 11. Peace in the world is threatened by class conflict and racism.

Consistent with his beliefs about the political universe, President Kaunda sees the contemporary international system as the epitome of man's unceasing struggle for power. The battle to maintain the balance of power has reached a crisis point with nations fitfully spending much of their wealth in stockpiling the instruments of war. National security and national prestige fuel the arms race - the marching of military power against military power - to the extent that the world can now be destroyed several times over. "Power", President Kaunda believes, "has now expanded until it occupies all the available space and clashes with countervailing power: power unlocked from the world of nature is used to hold together the world community in a precarious balance of opposing forces".¹⁹

The struggle for power in the family of man manifests itself in various forms. Among these are class conflict and racism. President Kaunda maintains, however, that "institutionalised racism", presently headquartered in South Africa, is a more serious threat to world peace and security than

¹⁷Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia, p. 68.

¹⁸Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 63.

¹⁹Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, pp. 68-69.

class conflict.²⁰ Speaking on the occasion of accepting an honorary degree from the University of Zambia, he warned the world to be wary of a "Black Backlash".²¹ Both at home and abroad, President Kaunda passionately appeals to the international community to help avert a racial war in Southern Africa; a war which, if allowed to ensue, is likely to assume ideological colouration, with the West and the East pitted on opposite sides.

Belief 12. Man must be a servant of a vision bigger than himself.

Belief 13. "...Only great characters are fitted to handle great power".²²

If the struggle for power is inherent in the business of living and as such endemically conflictual, how can there ever be peace in the family of men? President Kaunda believes that the source of peace in the political universe and the contemporary international system lies within man. It is only "when man learns, by bitter experience if in no other way, that the only hope for the peace and happiness of the world is to give political and economic expression to love for others we shall have entered not the Kingdom of Man but the Kingdom of God".²³ This is because "much of

²⁰Kaunda, Address by His Excellency The President of The Republic of Zambia Dr. K. D. Kaunda to the First World Conference For Action Against Apartheid held in Lagos, Nigeria, 22-26 August, 1977, p. 5.

²¹Kaunda, Southern Africa: A Time for Change (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1974).

²²Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 75.

²³Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 39.

the misery and injustice of our time is the consequence of our failure to develop the moral stature to be worthy of the degree of power we control".²⁴

Belief 14. Those who are against the establishment of a humanist state in Zambia are the enemy of the Zambian people.

Belief 15. "...the infiltration of foreign ideologies such as Marxist communism is a threat to African Unity."²⁵

In order to understand President Kaunda's conception of political opponents, it is first necessary to understand his fundamental political goals. In its ultimate and idealist form, "the goal" of President Kaunda is the establishment of a humanist society in the World. Hence the creation of a humanist society in Zambia, the goal of African Unity and World government should be seen as the progressive development toward the ultimate goal of a humanist society in the World. And since "the expectations of man do not apply to Zambia alone insofar as Humanism is concerned",²⁵ whosoever is against the creation of a humanist state in Zambia, the nursery from which humanism will hopefully spread to the rest of the world, is not only the political opponent of President Kaunda, but also of humanity. In Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation

²⁴Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 75-76.

²⁵Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 117.

²⁶Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. xii.

Part II, he contends:

It is a fair guess that the enemies of Humanism have understood that Zambian Humanism could constitute a very real threat to the system in which they have found security at the expense of others. This explains the resistance to the experiment from without and from within.²⁷

Who then is threatened by the philosophy of Humanism?

President Kaunda believes that communists, capitalists and racists are threatened by efforts at creating a humanist society in Zambia. This is because the ideologies of Communism, Capitalism and racism are inherently opposed to the tenets of Humanism. He contends that "Humanism accepts the universality of man. Whatever else he might be, he belongs to the human family. Because of this, Humanism is a direct challenge to Capitalism in the same way as it is a challenge to Communism". Humanism is a challenge to communist and capitalist societies because in these societies the economy is organized in such a manner as to divide God's people into various groups. In capitalist societies, President Kaunda believes, the "few exploit the masses" and "wealth becomes the yard-stick for measuring a man's importance". The communists, on the other hand, "see this world as a world for a certain type of workers, namely those oppressed by capitalists".²⁸

²⁷Ibid., p. 4.

²⁸Kaunda, Kaunda's Guidelines. Selected by Titus B. Mukupo. (Lusaka, Zambia: T.B. Publicity Enterprise, 1970), pp. 34-35. See also Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, chapters 12-15.

Belief 16. Neo-colonialism remains the greatest threat to African Unity.

President Kaunda is convinced that Capitalism, in the form of neo-colonialism, and Communism are a threat to African Unity. Neo-colonialism, he maintains, creates mutual suspicion among newly independent African states and is therefore destructive of the goals of African Unity.²⁹ On the other hand, he views the alignment of African states with the communist bloc as a shift in loyalty from Pan-Africanism to Pan-Communism. Ideological subservience, President Kaunda maintains, is a "subtle and debilitating form of colonial domination which can carve up Africa as effectively as anything achieved by the Great Powers in the late Nineteenth century".³⁰

Belief 17. Political opponents can afford the luxury of proposing simplistic and extreme solutions to social problems.

Belief 18. Political opponents may seek to destroy you in many ways.

Addressing himself specifically to issues relating to domestic political opponents, President Kaunda expresses reservations about the idea of an institutional opposition and the role of the intellectual. He maintains that the idea of an institutional opposition is foreign to African tradition. Traditional African societies operated on consensus and once decisions were made, it was a major sin against society for

²⁹Kaunda, Humanist in Africa, p. 117.

³⁰Ibid., p. 121.

those who participated in their formulation to agitate against them.

Moreover, President Kaunda contends that the functions of an institutional opposition have not always been understood. The opposition to government policy is very often transformed into a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Furthermore, a national leader's solidarity of support often becomes an invitation to opposition elements to use extra-constitutional means to destroy him.³¹

As to the role of the intellectual, President Kaunda maintains that intellectuals can be an asset or danger to national unity and nation-building. The aggrieved intellectual, he declares, is a threat to national unity because he is more apt to flirt with ideologies such as Communism. Unable to attract enough popular support to realize his ambitions, the aggrieved intellectual is likely to seek outside help to dislodge those in power.³²

President Kaunda perceived his political opponents as thoroughly adept at the use of various tactics to destroy those in power and through them the country. In a general warning to the people of Zambia, he noted:

Our enemies will tempt you with nice but misleading talk, money, and other things to be disloyal to the government which you yourselves elected. By favourably responding to such

³¹Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 108.

³²Ibid., p. 98.

subtle forces that seek to divide and rule you, you will be letting the nation down.³³

Partly as a political tactic and partly because they have never laboured under the responsibilities of government, President Kaunda believes, political opponents are excellent at proposing simplistic and extreme solutions to complex social problems.³⁴

In summary, President Kaunda perceives politics in humanist terms. Central to his humanist concept is a passionate belief in the worth and possibilities of man. Because man is the highest symbol of God's creation, all human activities - political, economic and social - must be geared to serving him. Any philosophy therefore which seeks to relegate man to the role of a means rather than an end in himself is perceived by President Kaunda as antithetical to the humanity in all of us and therefore must be seen as mankind's enemy. In this context, President Kaunda sees the philosophies and practices of Communism, Capitalism, and Apartheid and their adherents as his political enemies. Not only is man used as an instrument to be manipulated for some end by these philosophies, but, far worse, they provoke the evil in him. One of the evils in man is greed, which to President Kaunda is the source of conflict among men. Thus even though the universe is basically good and harmonious, the institutions of Capitalism, Communism and Apartheid

³⁴Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 65.

appeal to the animal instincts in man and consequently the political universe is both harmonious and conflictual.

Optimism - Pessimism

- Belief 19. We are optimistic because our trust in God and our fellowman has not been betrayed.
- Belief 20. Those who champion the superior moral position will always triumph.
- Belief 21. "...birth is always conquering death;...out of decay there springs renewal".³⁵
- Belief 22. "...every new area of discovery produces a new set of problems; the greater the circle of light, the larger the surrounding area of darkness."³⁶

President Kaunda's goals of creating a humanist society in Zambia, and a "United States of Africa" and a world government, may be characterized as short-term and long-term goals respectively. While he is undoubtedly optimistic about the prospects of achieving his goals, it is, however, an optimism tinged with pessimism in the short-run.

President Kaunda's optimism derives from his trust in God and his fellowman. In A Humanist in Africa, he declares:

The source of our optimism is not the ability to ignore unpalatable facts and refuse to look steadfastly upon the dark side of life. Our optimism springs rather from our faith in people....³⁷

In addition, his optimism is also predicated on his belief that the Humanist philosophy holds a morally superior

³⁵Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 138.

³⁶Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 43.

³⁷Ibid., p. 36.

position over the philosophies of Capitalism, Racism, and Communism. "God", President Kaunda submits, "has made man to be free, free from any want".³⁸ It is this goal of liberating man from want that Humanism champions. Thus to President Kaunda, the question is not whether man will be freed, but rather whether freedom will be achieved peacefully or violently. That the morally superior position will always triumph is attested to by Zambia's struggle for independence. "It was humanity in revolt", he maintains, "that won us our freedom. I believed we triumphed not because we had the greater power, but because we occupied the superior moral positions...."³⁹

Belief 23. "...the ideal of African Unity will shortly take a giant step forward".⁴⁰

Belief 24. A "United States of Africa" will eventually come into existence because of certain existential imperatives in the environment and the orientation of Africans.

As for the prospects of a "United States of Africa", President Kaunda's general optimism is further reinforced by the realities of international and continental politics which are forcing closer links upon groups of African states. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated by the growing links between Zambia and East African states. In 1967, the Zambian government formally applied to join the East African

³⁸Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. 19.

³⁹Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 21.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 132.

Community, a community which seems to be gradually dis-integrating. Zambia is also a member of the Economic Commission for Africa's East and Central African subdivision. This is a broader group made up of 14 states - Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia - with headquarters in Lusaka. On a more concrete level, Zambia and Tanzania are now economically linked by such joint projects as the Tanzam Pipeline, the Tanzam Road Services and the Tanzam Railway.⁴¹ Furthermore, he maintains, the existence of a common enemy - the White minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia - is a powerful aid to Pan-African Unity. The third existential factor reinforcing President Kaunda's optimism is the Charter for African Unity. For him, this Charter is more than a pious hope. It established a machinery for closer cooperation, the first logical step toward the majestic goal of a "United States of Africa".⁴² Moreover, the prospects for the eventual creation of a "United States of Africa" is further enhanced by the genuine international thinking in Africa, the very richness and diversity of viewpoint in the continent, and the youthfulness of the vast majority of Africa's peoples and leaders.⁴³

⁴¹Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 203-34.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 127-30.

⁴³Ibid., p. 113.

While acknowledging the possibility of diverse viewpoint solidifying into power-blocs, President Kaunda views the situation as "paradoxically a powerful aid to unity". This is because in the prevailing situation where almost all the states are equal, every state has some contribution to make to the foundations of African unity. If there were one utterly dominant state over the continent, on the other hand, the rest of the states would be oriented to resisting its influence and rejecting its ideas as a matter of pride. Furthermore, because President Kaunda believes that youthfulness "is characterized by idealism, enthusiasm and elasticity of mind", Africa's youthful population is an additional source of optimism.⁴⁴

Belief 25. "...the ideal of World community has taken hold of the human imagination."⁴⁵

Recall that the core of President Kaunda's optimism is his faith in God and his fellowman. In the case of a world government, his optimism hinges more on a particular subset of his fellowman - the young people of the world. President Kaunda believes that:

...the young people of our world are not necessarily doomed to become the cynical and time-serving old. They care about poverty and discrimination and injustice, and though their protests may occasionally take somewhat bizarre forms, they see further and feel more deeply than many of our generation.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 131.

⁴⁵Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 102.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 132.

The role he attributes to music and art, the internationalization of knowledge and the evolution of a common conscience is an additional source of hope for the eventual creation of a world government. Music and art help in dissipating "the prejudice, arrogance and exclusiveness of the old nationalist sentiment". Although cognizant of the agonizingly slow pace of such a process, President Kaunda is nevertheless optimistic because he sees "the shadowy outlines of world community emerging from such human activities".⁴⁷

Coupled with the above, President Kaunda sees the emergence of common conscience in the world as a hopeful development. Today, he notes, states which perpetrate moral atrocities are severely condemned by the world community. In addition, this conscience is also becoming increasingly responsive to the needs of victims of great disasters.⁴⁸

Belief 26. There are "no signs that the world will, in the most fundamental sense, be a better place in your time than it was in mine".⁴⁹

Belief 27. "...this is a world in which materialism by far surpasses political morality."⁵⁰

In the short-run, President Kaunda is pessimistic about the realization of his goals. This pessimism is based on his assessment of man's ability to change in the short-run. The realization of the kind of world Kaunda envisages depends

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 102.

⁴⁸Loc. cit.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 131.

⁵⁰Kaunda, Africa in the Sixties: The Decade of Decision and Definition (Lusaka, Zambia: Zambia Information Services, 1969), p. 12.

so vitally on man's willingness to embrace the truth and the good. And yet it is this transformation in man that seems unattainable in the short-run.

Essentially, the truth and the good for President Kaunda involves a fundamental change of human nature; a change from man's selfishness to his communal instincts; a change from the "greasy path of self-aggrandizement" to a moral commitment to the creation of a world community in which man would live by love. Although Kaunda acknowledges that "technology has established a rudimentary world community", he believes, however, that "man's fundamental problem is an internal one, and until he develops the wisdom to recognize" the fact that he has to change, "he will cast about him in ever increasing desperation for the key which unlocks the outer gates of utopia".⁵¹

In summary, President Kaunda's philosophical beliefs about the realization of his goals are a composite of both optimism and pessimism. Perhaps the best summary is provided in his own words:

...the world is a great seething, bubbling cauldron of essences both poisonous and health-giving. Life is never as bad as the old fear or the young believe. So avoid both cynical pessimism and facile optimism and discover some hard realism for yourselves.⁵²

⁵¹Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 130-1.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 138.

Predictability

Belief 28. God has a "Grand Design" for man.

Belief 29. It is the essence of politics that things change.

Belief 30. The object of all government is the surprisingly unpredictable human material.

President Kaunda sees the political future as both "deterministic" and "indeterministic". The political future is determined, and therefore predictable, in the sense that God has a "Grand Design" for man. But it is also "indetermined", and therefore unpredictable since only God knows the direction of his "Great Design" for man. In President Kaunda's words:

I do not believe that we were intended to thrash our way blindly through history, either as individuals or as nations. Every act of obedience to God must take us nearer to some great goal. Only God knows what the great blueprint of life is, and the most that we can do is always be ready for God to cross our path and lead us off in some strange, new direction.⁵³

Increasingly, however, Kaunda seems to define God's "Grand Design" for man as "the state of perfection of man on earth".⁵⁴ In this context, the nation-state system to President Kaunda is defective as a vehicle of human destiny, because it has divided the human family into little earthly ghettos.⁵⁵

⁵³Kaunda, Humanist in Africa, p. 39; Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. 127.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 129.

⁵⁵Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 58.

Related to his belief about the historical destiny of man is the idea of change. As a participant in the nationalist movements that have significantly altered the political contours of Africa, Kaunda is keenly cognizant of the inevitability of change. Since change is one of the few certainties of political life, he is convinced that a nation must be built on a framework capable of enduring radical political change.⁵⁶

While the component parts of the universe are moving toward some great goal, President Kaunda sees the art of governing as characterized by imprecision. Because "the object of all governments is the surprising, unpredictable human material", government necessarily operates "in an area where political, social, and economic forces interact, and where the number of imponderables which history throws in for good measure are considerable".⁵⁷

Control of Historical Development

Belief 31. "Man's development towards this perfection is controlled entirely by himself".⁵⁸

Belief 32. "Each one of us on this earth has a part to play in this God's 'Grand Design' for Man."⁵⁹

Belief 33. "On what we decide today rests the future hope of our 4 million people."⁶⁰

⁵⁶Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 89.

⁵⁷Loc. cit.

⁵⁸Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation Part II.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 129.

⁶⁰Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection From His Writings, p. 221.

Consistent with his beliefs that the future is only in part predictable, Kaunda is convinced that man can to a large extent influence historical developments. Even though no one knows the direction of God's "Grand Design", man is, however, endowed with great faculties and is given the opportunities to contribute towards the creation of a perfect human society, where "pure hearts would abound everywhere and therefore the Will of God would begin to be done on earth as it is in Heaven".⁶¹ Man, Kaunda maintains, is encouraged to be better than his best to speed along the process whereby "man is thrusting like an underground seed upwards toward the light".⁶²

Belief 34. Leaders must remain loyal to the common man because he is the master.

Belief 35. "...there are no mechanical substitutes for integrity in a national leader. No system devised by man can compensate for moral cowardice and vacillation."⁶³

While President Kaunda is somewhat modest about his personal role in "moving" and shaping history in the desired direction, he believes that the role of leaders is of utmost importance. For Kaunda, moving history in the desired direction entails essentially the creation of a humanist society in the world - a world in which Man will be supreme.

⁶¹Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, pp. 16-7.

⁶²Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 43.

⁶³Ibid., p. 37.

Consonant with his conception of historical development, Kaunda sees the role of leaders basically as that of a servant, dedicated to the realization of God's "Grand Design" for Man. Leadership is so decisive a factor in moving history in the desired direction that he has evolved a list of "important qualities" of leadership. In an address at the University of Zambia Fourth Graduation Ceremony, President Kaunda summarized some important leadership qualities thus:

Good and commanding character, honesty and truthfulness, prudence, patriotism, dedication to duty, fortitude, justice and tenacity, and depth of vision. A good leader must radiate confidence among his followers, have moral courage, self-discipline combined with simplicity, and humility.⁶⁴

Added to the above qualities, leaders in all spheres of government and indeed in all sectors of society should be exemplary by their personal conduct and above all be characterized by love for the people they lead.⁶⁵

The Role of Chance

Belief 36. Peace cannot come about by accident; it has got to be worked for.

Belief 37. "Success does not just occur; it is planned and organized...."⁶⁶

⁶⁴Kaunda, "The Challenge of the Zambian Youth" in Fourth Graduation Ceremony: Addresses by H.E. The President (Chancellor) and Professor L.K.H. Goma (Vice-Chancellor). (Lusaka, Zambia: Zambia Information Services, 1972), p. 18.

⁶⁵For President Kaunda's comprehensive comments on leadership and leaders, see the following: Kaunda, Africa In The Sixties; Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa; Kaunda, Kaunda's Guidelines; Kaunda, Take Up The Challenge; Kaunda, "A Nation of Equals", The Kabwe Declaration; Kaunda, The "Watershed" Speech.

⁶⁶Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. 130.

Even though President Kaunda sees a good measure of imponderables in the realm of governing, he attributes little or no role to chance in human affairs. In his view, Man can achieve his goals by deliberate and diligent planning and hard work. Thus Kaunda maintains that the future of mankind will not automatically improve by some evolutionary process or historical driving force but only by some conscious and deliberate effort on our part.⁶⁷

In summary, President Kaunda's philosophical beliefs may be stated thus: man is a spiritual being created in the image of God. He (man) is basically good, though residual evil derived from his animal ancestry is constantly provoked by society's institutional arrangements. Because President Kaunda believes in God and man's basic goodness, he (Kaunda) is more optimistic than pessimistic about the prospects of achieving his fundamental goals and values, believes that the political future is both "deterministic" and "indeterministic", that man has some control over his destiny and that chance has little or no role in human affairs. This in essence is President Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism.

Instrumental Beliefs

Selecting Goals for Political Action

Belief 38. Political goals must be based on moral principles rather than political expediency.

⁶⁷Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 130-2; Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection From His Writings, p. 245.

Belief 39. "No injunctions of old creeds, religious, political, social or cultural, are valid if they diminish man".⁶⁸

Moral principles for President Kaunda mean, in essence, the organization of society in a way that expresses God's purposes; God's purposes defined as the recognition and enshrining of the centrality of Man. As Kaunda puts it:

I envisage the service of God as being most practically effected through the service of one's fellow men. No earthly idol whether the state, the family or anything else, ought to take priority over respect for mankind; they are only worthy of respect in so far as they are images of the human spirit, enshrine its presence and aid its self-fulfilment.⁶⁹

In Kaunda's view "it is the quality of the individual who finally decides the destiny of the State and beyond, the fate of the world".⁷⁰

In Black Government? President Kaunda submits that nationalist leaders challenged the authority of the colonial powers because they could not accept their moral basis. With specific reference to his opposition to the Federation of Central Africa, Kaunda noted that man has certain inalienable rights and that these rights were merely paid lip service under the federal arrangement. He condemned the constitutional arrangement of the federation as "unethical, unchristian, and contrary to Western democratic values" for

⁶⁸Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 103.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 133; Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 78.

classifying human beings into "ordinary", "special" and "ungraded" (voteless).⁷¹ Thus his belief in the necessity for a Black Government is based not on a desire to see Africans in control, he argues, but rather on the belief that "majority government is the only just government".⁷²

Consistent with his belief that any action - be it national or international - which diminishes the importance of man is immoral; President Kaunda maintains that decisions made by United National Independence Party "must be based not on false pride and selfishness, but on a sense of duty to Zambia, the continent and mankind as a whole".⁷³

Belief 40. There can be no compromise when the survival of humanity is at stake.

In issues involving mankind, President Kaunda believes that there can be no other but the goal of destroying all the dehumanizing aspects of our contemporary world. Among these are Capitalism, Imperialism, Colonialism, Oppression and Racism. Since man is one and indivisible, he believes, it is humanity as a whole that is threatened by these dehumanizing forces wherever man is misused and degraded. In this vein, he declares:

⁷¹Kenneth Kaunda and Colin Morris, Black Government?: A Discussion Between Colin Morris and Kenneth Kaunda. (Lusaka, Zambia: United Society For Christian Literature, 1960), pp. 64-8.

⁷²Ibid., p. 112.

⁷³Kaunda, Kaunda's Guidelines, p. 122.

We are engaged in a struggle against any form of imperialism and colonialism not because it has as its agents White men, but because it has many more wrong sides than good ones.⁷⁴

As for the struggle in Southern Africa, Kaunda maintains that the principles of justice in search of peace and cooperation cannot be compromised because our basic humanity cannot be compromised for expedient solutions.⁷⁵ Furthermore, Kaunda maintains that the only real basis for international understanding and cooperation is mutual respect among human beings irrespective of race, colour or creed. Without such a foundation, in his view, international relations would be based on dishonesty if not hypocrisy.

Belief 41. "It is more important to us that Government should be humane than efficient".⁷⁶

Belief 42. Extreme egalitarianism or wrongly conceived egalitarianism must not be allowed to stifle efficiency.

Obviously there is a value conflict here - conflict between egalitarianism and efficiency. But as it should now be obvious, President Kaunda believes that man must be elevated above everything else. However, he concedes the necessity for compromise between egalitarianism on the one hand and efficiency on the other. How should this compromise be achieved?

⁷⁴Kaunda and Morris, Black Government?, p. 111.

⁷⁵Kaunda, Southern Africa: A Time for Change, p. 6.

⁷⁶Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 33.

According to President Kaunda, the question of egalitarianism is intimately intertwined with the question of humanitarianism. Thus if government is to be humane, it must not only promote equality but also must be accessible to the people. But the need for equality and accessibility to government institutions and officials must be balanced by the need for efficiency and the demands of government functions. Kaunda acknowledges that passionate believers in democracy like himself usually eschew any discussions about the differential capacities of men. This is because opponents of democracy - Nazism, Fascism, Apartheid - have used these differences to eliminate or subjugate groups deemed inferior. Nevertheless, he believes that extreme egalitarianism or wrongly conceived egalitarianism, which ignores differences in capacity and achievement, has not served democracy well. He explains this as follows:

...in its moderate forms, the pursuit of equality prohibits ruthlessness in the strong, protects the weak from wanton injury and defines certain areas of equality which must not be transgressed. But it does not seek to eliminate individual differences or their consequences. This judicious insistence on equality had produced many measures which a modern democracy regards as vital - minimum wage laws, graduated income tax, the principle of one man one vote, the raising of the status of women.⁷⁷

⁷⁷Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 61-66.

Pursuit of Goals

- Belief 43. Ideology provides a powerful vehicle for conditioning and moulding Man's thinking and value system.
- Belief 44. "...no mechanical, political or administrative unity of mankind is remotely possible until the sacred value of man possesses not only your imaginations as a vision but also your wills as a programme of action and way of life."⁷⁸
- Belief 45. Differences must be reconciled rather than repressed.

President Kaunda is convinced that no approach is as effective for realizing his goals as the formulation and propagation of the ideology of Humanism.⁷⁹ Since the most effective control over man is control of his mind, there must therefore be propagated a religion of humanity.⁸⁰ The children must be indoctrinated about the glories of Zambia and the privileges of being citizens of Africa; they must be indoctrinated about the oneness of mankind the world over. "Provided the spirit of free enquiry, and the critical faculty is not impaired", he contends that "nothing but good can come from moulding the child's mind in such a way as to make him a useful and constructive citizen of our future society".⁸¹

On the role of man in general, President Kaunda believes

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 105.

⁷⁹Kaunda, Kaunda Guidelines, p. 37; Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Parts I and II.

⁸⁰Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 103.

⁸¹Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 92.

that man must be made to realize the centrality of his position in the establishment of a humanist society. In addition to strengthening the authority of organizations such as the United Nations, O.A.U. and others; the extension of links with other nations in such areas as economic development, foreign policy and defence; and the establishment of an African university to train future leaders, Kaunda maintains that man must be made psychologically oriented to "think more in terms of things which unite him to other men than the things which divide him from them".⁸²

Belief 46. "Closer links between states must be voluntarily entered upon without outside pressures other than the power of persuasion and preaching of the Gospel of Unity."⁸³

Whether it is the immediate task of creating a humanist society in Zambia or the long-term goals of a United States of Africa and a world government, President Kaunda believes that the best approach is a deliberate systematic strategy characterized by patience, tolerance and a willingness to compromise. In a somewhat specific reference to African Unity, he warned:

the coercion which has been used throughout history...to bring about large political groupings, is not open to us. The old colonialists used force to define many of the boundaries of Africa. We are not prepared to use the same means to alter them.⁸⁴

⁸²Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 103-5; Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 131.

⁸³Ibid., p. 126.

⁸⁴Loc. cit.

Consistent with his beliefs about the rôle of ideology and the centrality of man in the pursuit of goals, President Kaunda advocates the establishment of a system of political and economic institutions that will facilitate the full participation of the common man in the affairs that affect his life. In the political sphere, he sees Participatory Democracy as providing the institutional and philosophical environment conducive to the realization of a humanist society in Zambia, and by extension in the world. Accordingly, he defines Participatory Democracy as a system of government in which "people are able to participate effectively in influencing policies and decisions in the day-to-day running of Government".⁸⁵

Related to Participatory Democracy and giving effect to it is the political party. In President Kaunda's view, the political party is the institution which enables them "to perform the noble task of running the affairs of our country in the clearest and tidiest way possible for the good of every individual citizen".⁸⁶ Because Participatory Democracy entails more than the occasional participation of the common man in elections, the common man or ordinary citizen must be given the opportunity to influence the selection of the leadership of the party. This is because

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 7; Kaunda's Guidelines, p. 6.

⁸⁶ Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection From His Writings, p. 223; Kaunda, The "Watershed" Speech; Kaunda, The Challenge of the Future.

the people are the source of power and therefore the institutions of government and the party must be decentralized to ensure their participation in the decision-making process.⁸⁷

Paradoxical though it may seem, President Kaunda believes that a one-party system is the most effective vehicle for the promotion of Participatory Democracy.

Arguing the case for a one-party system, he observes that the democratic process does not necessarily equate with a two-party system. Thus while the Westminster model is suited to the genius of the British people, it is, however, of limited value in modern Africa unless drastically modified. In contrast to Britain, the states of Africa are permeated with deep-seated historical causes of divisions to the extent that the very foundations of the states could be torn apart if the opposition group were given too much latitude to inflame opinion. Thus President Kaunda concludes:

Hard though it may sound, ... survival is more important than freedom of expression. The situation of near anarchy created in the recent past in such territories as the Congo, the Sudan and Pakistan through a multiplicity of weak political parties is a moral to us all. For a nation can flourish and its people benefit under strong government but anarchy is the basic denial of freedom because every aspect of the nation's life is paralyzed. National survival is the basic good; all other qualities are contingent upon it. The great enemy of freedom is not totalitarianism but chaos.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II.

⁸⁸Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, pp. 106-8.

Kaunda maintains, however, that a one-party system must not be imposed but rather must be instituted with the consent of the people. In fact, he conceded his preference for a de facto one-party system to one constitutionally entrenched or perpetuated by rigging electoral arrangements. Since democracy is sovereignty of the people, in Kaunda's view, there is no better power-structure than one in which the people give overwhelming majority to one political party. To Kaunda what is significant is commitment to the democratic process rather than constitutional arrangements.⁸⁹

Somewhat related to the above discussion, President Kaunda believes that the task of creating a humanist society in Zambia demands unity and discipline. Real victory in every endeavour in life, he maintains, is a product of collective effort. Thus he frequently appeals for unity and discipline among the people of Zambia. Kaunda admonishes his political associates against the tendency of seeking revenge against those who have opposed or treated them unkindly. Zambia will have no future, he asserts, if Zambians entertain an attitude of avenging themselves against each other. "Men do not live in the past; they live in the present and prepare themselves for the future",⁹⁰ he concludes.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 109; Kaunda, Africa in the Sixties: The Decade of Decision and Definition, pp. 25-7.

⁹⁰ Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection from His Writings, p. 220; Kaunda, Kaunda's Guidelines, pp. 67-72; Kaunda, Africa in the Sixties: The Decade of Decision and Definition, p. 21.

Belief 47. "Since our emphasis is people and all activities are centred on serving the people, there is no better alternative...than to control the resources of the country and the means of production and distribution."⁹¹

President Kaunda has a keen appreciation of the role of the economy in regard to the eventual realization of his goals. In Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation Parts I and II, and various other speeches, he has consistently vowed to bring about economic participatory democracy in Zambia. Economic participatory democracy, as defined by Kaunda, is the placement of all major means of production and distribution in the safe repository of the people. As with political power, economic power must also be held by the people so as to ensure the evolution of an egalitarian society in which everyone is able to participate in the affairs of Zambia. Towards this end, Kaunda proposed certain programmes essentially geared to creating a socialist economic system, a system deemed capable of eradicating all forms of evil that degrade man - poverty, ignorance, disease, crime, exploitation and laziness.⁹²

Calculation and Control of Risks

Belief 48. "...the moral law of this universe is so delicately balanced that one rarely enjoys advantages without also suffering penalties."⁹³

⁹¹Kaunda, Kaunda's Guidelines, p. 1.

⁹²See Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Parts I and II; Kaunda, The "Watershed" Speech; Kaunda, Take Up the Challenge.

⁹³Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 97.

Belief 49. It is one of the peculiarities of politics in contrast to other fields of human endeavours that the consequences of decisions only manifest themselves with the passage of time.

The moral law of this universe, President Kaunda believes, operates in "relatives" and not in "absolutes". Thus the risk of unintended outcomes is always present in any given political action. However, the advantages and penalties associated with any political action at promoting one's goals are not equally distributed. There are therefore some approaches which provide more advantages than others. The risks of political action must thus be so calculated and controlled so as to reduce the penalties inherent in all political endeavours. In other words, in the pursuit of goals, a strategy of goal maximization rather than risk elimination must govern political action. This belief of President Kaunda is reflected in his comments on nation-building in Zambia.

It is always a hazardous business to change the foundations of a society, and it can never be done without a certain degree of social and economic dislocation. I and my colleagues are responsibly aware of the dangers inherent in the course of action to which we are committed, but the inequities and irrelevancies of the structure we inherited leave us no alternative. Our duty to our people impels us to press ahead with the creation of a modern African state as swiftly as possible.⁹⁴

Because the just scales of the moral law of the universe hold both advantages and penalties, Kaunda believes

⁹⁴Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 69. See also Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 64-5; Kaunda, Kaunda Guidelines, p. 3.

that decisions are rarely self-evidently correct. The consequences of political decisions are therefore to some extent inherently incalculable and uncontrollable. His observation about nationalism in Africa is illustrative: "the force which created the new nations - nationalism - can work against the ultimate aim of African Unity. The more successful we are sharpening a people's consciousness of being a nation the less likely they are to take kindly to submerging that new-found identity in a wider union".⁹⁵

Belief 50. "We pay a heavy price for our fear of failure. It hinders our growth and narrows the range of our achievements."⁹⁶

Even though President Kaunda maintains that some degree of risk is inherent in every political decision, he nevertheless counsels against the "tendency to keep to the beaten track".⁹⁷ While a safe course of action guarantees some modest degree of success, it is the calculated risks which offer the possibility of greater reward. Apart from the possibility of greater reward, Kaunda attributes an important role to failure. In his view, failure is a great teacher and therefore we must have the courage to risk failure.⁹⁸

⁹⁵Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 126.

⁹⁶Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 116.

⁹⁷Kaunda, Kaunda's Guidelines, p. 4.

⁹⁸Kaunda, Letter to My Children, pp. 115-121.

The Best Timing of Efforts

Belief 51. "There is little point in worrying about the speed of progress if one is going in the wrong direction."⁹⁹

Belief 52. Once a goal has been decided on, there can be no procrastination of efforts to realize it.

Belief 53. We must capitalize on every opportunity to advance our goals.

In general President Kaunda's strategy seems more concerned with the consequences of efforts in pursuit of goals than with the timing of efforts. This does not, however, mean that timing has no place in Kaunda's tactics. As beliefs 52 and 53 indicate, President Kaunda maintains that there comes a time when action has to be taken in pursuit of goals. Speaking about the progress of Humanism in Zambia, he declared:

For over eleven years we have preached discipline, patience, consideration and everything that Humanism means to a people like us. Now this will no longer be the case. Time for teaching is over. We have given opportunity to everybody to reform. Now it is time for action.¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, President Kaunda believes that some situations present better opportunities than others. Speaking on the subject of African unity, he dismissed as misleading the contention that African leaders should first concentrate their efforts on building their individual states before

⁹⁹Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, p. 59.

¹⁰⁰Kaunda, His Excellency's Broadcast to The Nation, Wednesday, January 28th, 1976, p. 7.

before embarking on larger groupings. It is misleading because "it takes account neither of psychological nor economic factors which indicate that the sooner we press forward towards our ultimate goal the better".¹⁰¹ In other words, the goal of African unity is best pursued now that Africans have not yet become psychologically wedded to their various states.

Utility of Means for Advancing One's Interests

The pragmatic doctrine "the end justifies the means" is of little significance in President Kaunda's instrumental beliefs. The means, he is convinced, must be justified on their own merit - they must conform to standards of moral rightness. This pious approach of President Kaunda to politics seems to have influenced his government's policy with regard to the recognition of Biafra and the opposition of Communist military presence in Southern Africa. It seems illogical for Kaunda to be preaching the desirability of a "United States of Africa" and at the same time endorsing attempts that will further balkanize the continent. But recall his instrumental belief: "Differences must be reconciled rather than repressed".

Belief 54. Humanism is a great charter for the common man.

¹⁰¹Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, pp. 113-5.

Belief 55. "Humanism...believes that God has given to every man, regardless of his ethnic origins, an open future - power to become what he might be - the guarantee of equality; the possibility of excellence."¹⁰²

In the philosophical dimension of President Kaunda's operational code, we discussed his political philosophy of Humanism in terms of his assumptions and premises about fundamental issues relating to the realm of politics. Here we are interested in Humanism in the context of means. In particular, we are interested in the utility of Humanism as means for advancing President Kaunda's interests relative to other means.

Much of President Kaunda's writing and speeches on means are devoted to Humanism. In contrast to Communism, Capitalism and Apartheid, Humanism, in President Kaunda's view, promotes genuine equality, freedom and justice in the family of man. In his correspondence with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, President Kaunda asserted that man's natural "desire to be free to pursue life's happiness in his own way without undue restriction will remain unquenchable no matter what force is brought to bear upon him". The increasing demand for freedom in Communist countries, he observes, is a testament to man's natural yearning for "psychic space".¹⁰³

President Kaunda acknowledges the difficulty of

¹⁰²Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 55.

¹⁰³Kaunda, Dear Mr. Vorster..., pp. 3-4.

of defining equality precisely beyond generally-accepted broad principles such as "all men are born equal" and "all men are equal in the possession of certain legal, civil and political rights". As a goal for national policy based on democratic philosophy, he defines equality as "equality of opportunity". In practice, "equality of opportunity" means "an equal chance to compete within the framework of goals and the structure of rules established by a particular society."¹⁰⁴

"Freedom", as is "equality", is a concept subject to so many varying interpretations as to become almost devoid of meaning. For President Kaunda, however, "freedom" is conceptualized as a "by-product of service...blended with obedience to produce responsibility". In Kaunda's view:

Obedience is the highest exercise of freedom. The crown of the evolutionary process is not Man but responsible Man, and responsibility is the tension between freedom and obedience. Responsibility is the constructive use of freedom. Man is given freedom in order to obey....The essence of obedience is neither fear of punishment nor hope of reward, but consent....There is no loss of freedom when men voluntarily accept the restriction of their liberties. Freedom and obedience are two sides of the same coin. Freedom without obedience is self-will, while obedience without freedom is slavery.¹⁰⁵

As regards "justice", President Kaunda contends that the Aristotlean conception of justice - "justice...means giving to everyman his due" - is plagued with problems of

¹⁰⁴Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 60.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 89-91.

implementation. First, selfishness produces selective perception, that is, the tendency to be sensitive about one's own rights and not about those of others. Secondly, there are situations in which it is impossible for everybody to receive his due. These difficulties notwithstanding, Kaunda maintains that "justice" must possess two characteristics: (1) "Justice" must be "impersonal in the sense that it ignores the wealth, class, tribe or wisdom of those who seek it". (2) "Justice" must be constant in the sense that it is consistently applied and rationally changed.¹⁰⁶

Belief 56. "Humanism is not only an attempt to clarify the fundamental purposes to which power should be dedicated but also a check on that aggressive instinct, which I share with all men."¹⁰⁷

Belief 57. "Power is an instrument which we must employ to serve our fellow men".¹⁰⁸

Belief 58. "...war is always a tragically inferior form of diplomacy."¹⁰⁹

President Kaunda has devoted much thought to the role of power in the affairs of man. Recall his philosophical beliefs (beliefs 5 and 6 on Page 48). Consistent with these beliefs, Kaunda is convinced that "the state must always have a monopoly of ultimate power - the power even of life and death over its citizens in order to maintain law and

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 95-6.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁰⁸Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection From His Writings, p.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 70.

order. It is this monopoly of power alone which makes possible peace, order and justice".¹¹⁰

While the state must have monopoly of ultimate power, it behoves, however, those entrusted with state power to use it for the benefit of their fellow men rather than for personal self-aggrandizement. Thus conceived, President Kaunda conceptualized power as (1) power over people - compulsion, and (2) power with people - persuasion. In his view, persuasion, and not force of any kind, is the most effective form of power for dealing with people. This is because history has amply demonstrated that truly great leaders are those who have successfully gained the respect of their followers to the extent that their appeals are more powerful than commands. Furthermore, he submits:

To exercise great patience in the use of power demands that one should be an optimist about the nature of one's fellow men. Because I believed that there is rationality and nobility in Man's character, I am prepared to take the risk of appealing to his better self before embarking upon a policy of regimentation.¹¹¹

Belief 59. If mankind is to survive, our only choice is to employ non-violence as a method for resolving conflicts.

Not only are all forms of violent methods for resolving conflicts in the family of man inferior, but in President Kaunda's view they are also destructive of the very man they are intended to serve. Whereas non-violence -

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 70.

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 79-81.

a Humanist approach - is an "important social agent for the betterment of mankind", violent approaches debase man.¹¹²

Belief 60. Military governments are always bad forms of government.

Military governments are, according to President Kaunda, by their very character authoritarian. Because of its heavy reliance on physical force, he condemns military rule as poor education in democracy. "With certain brilliant exceptions", he contends, "the military mind is not adept at the art of politics. It knows little of the compromises, accommodations and persuasion which underlie political decisions". Thus military rule sets in motion forces that inhibit the process of nation-building.¹¹³

The instrumental dimension of President Kaunda's operational code belief system is considerably interrelated with his philosophical dimension. In essence, the instrumental dimension of his operational code may be simply summarized as: promote and enshrine the centrality of man. This calls for the establishment of participatory democratic institutions and the unconditional rejection of any and every means which diminish and subordinate man.

¹¹²Kaunda and Morris, Black Government?, pp. 99-100; Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda: Selection From His Writings, pp. 208-10.

¹¹³Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, pp. 110-1; Kaunda, Africa in The Sixties: The Decade of Decision and Definition, p. 22.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

DIMENSIONS OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S "OPERATIONAL CODE" BELIEFS

Evidence based on the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda, as presented in Chapter Three, suggests that his beliefs constitute a "belief system". As conceptualized by Philip Converse, the salient feature in the concept of a "belief system" is the idea of "constraint or functional interdependence". In a static sense, "constraint or functional interdependence" refers to our success in predicting Kaunda's other beliefs from a knowledge that he holds a specified attitude or belief. In dynamic terms, it refers to the probability that a change in one element or belief of the "belief system" would psychologically require changes in the other elements or beliefs of the "belief system".¹

The attribute of interdependence or interconnectedness in President Kaunda's beliefs hinges on the first philosophical belief - The Nature of Politics. This belief-category in President Kaunda's operational code belief system may be conceived of as the "master belief". The "master belief" is the dominant belief which influences all the other

¹Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief System in Mass Public", in Apter, David E. (ed.). Ideology and Discontent, pp. 207-8. See Also Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957).

component beliefs in the belief system. Central to Kaunda's "master belief" is the goodness and worth of Man. Whereas the core of the central elements of the "master beliefs" of many political actors is largely influenced by the image of the evil in man,² Kaunda's is based on the goodness in man.

This belief in the goodness of man and the unity of mankind forms the core of President Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism. As noted elsewhere, Humanism means a passionate belief in the worth and possibilities of man. Since President Kaunda believes that man is created in the image of God and he (man) is the highest symbol of God's creation, man must therefore be central to all human endeavours. While man still possesses some of the evil instincts of his animal ancestry - evil instincts such as greed, selfishness, hatred - he is, however, slowly evolving towards perfection. By perfection, President Kaunda means that man is growing in self-knowledge and will eventually evolve social, political and economic institutions to which he will be completely adjusted and within which his vices will be neutralized while his virtues will be strengthened. This process, President Kaunda believes, Humanism seeks to promote and

²For some evidence of the dominance of the evil image in the "master beliefs" of political actors, see Nathan Leites; The Operational Code of the Politburo, and Ole Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs".

nurture as opposed to the philosophies of Capitalism, Communism and Apartheid, which appeal to the evil in man.

In policy terms, President Kaunda sees Humanism as a "political philosophy which endeavours to devise a social, political and economic order which is based on Man's truth rather than on Man's untruth".³ Man's truth here refers to the elevation of man and his needs as the supreme value in human community in contrast to the elevation of such earthly idols as states, nations, races, ethnic groups, tribes and families. The social, political and economic order consonant with President Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism is Participatory Democracy. In operation terms, this entails the complete control by the people of all of society's resources and their active participation in all affairs affecting their lives. This control is achieved through the people's control of all of society's economic, political and social institutions entrusted with the administration of society's resources for their benefit. Such an arrangement to President Kaunda will eliminate the exploitation of man by man, a practice which degrades both the exploiter and the exploited. Put simply, President Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism seeks to establish an ideal human society.

This brief analysis illustrates the extent to which the operational code beliefs of political actors are profoundly shaped by their beliefs about man. Even though President

³Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia, Part II, p. 4.

Kaunda is cognizant of the evil man has perpetuated on his fellowman, he attributes this failing more to our social institutional arrangements than to an innate attribute of man. Thus political opponents, in President Kaunda's view are misguided, temporarily lured away from their essential goodness by society's institutional arrangements. While the philosophies of his opponents are irreconcilably opposed to his Humanism, the opponents themselves are not because the good in them will eventually triumph.

The operational code belief system of President Kaunda seems to have been molded significantly by Christian and ~~traditional~~ African values, values which were very pervasive in his environment. Christianity is undoubtedly one of the main sources of President Kaunda's beliefs. Even a cursory reading of his operational code belief system would reveal the pervasiveness of the underlying Christian values. It should be noted, however, that even though President Kaunda is a staunch Christian, he is, nevertheless, not given to that religious fanaticism that proclaims Christianity as the only true faith. For him religion means faith in God, the Almighty Creator. Moreover, President Kaunda is not characterized by the extreme pessimism noted of a number of Christian thinkers.⁴ In fact, President

⁴See Robert K. Ward, Realism and Idealism in the Political Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (unpublished thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Windsor, 1966).

Kaunda has on occasion been very critical of certain types of Christianity vis-a-vis other religions.

In a Humanist in Africa, he notes:

I believe that the legacy of certain types of Christianity which emphasise the sinfulness and depravity of Man is more of a curse than a blessing to us. I doubt that the people of Africa really knew what misery was until the missionary came....I people who have had their self-confidence driven out of them by aggressive Colonialism need a faith which strengthens their belief in their own possibilities, not one which has them grovelling before an Old Testament God, beating their breasts and wailing about their unworthiness....Yet I cannot help feeling that the secret of the growing impact of Islam upon Africa is that it is a religion which reinforces men's belief in themselves without denying their dependence upon Allah. It is a militant, nationalistic, intolerant faith, yet it is a faith for men. Is Christianity a faith for men?⁵

President Kaunda is a Christian Humanist, whose optimism, it seems, derives from the influence of African tradition. Not only does he believe that Humanism is salient in Christ's teachings, but more importantly he is convinced that the purest form of service to God is unconditional service to one's fellowmen.

While the moral underpinnings of President Kaunda's Humanist beliefs derive from Christian values, traditional African society provides him an example of how men can live in harmony with their fellowmen and how man can be made central to all human endeavours. According to President Kaunda, traditional African societies have always placed a

⁵See Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 38.

high value on man. The centrality of man in these societies can be attributed to: (1) the African's relationship with Nature and (2) the psychological impact on Africans of centuries of living in tribal societies. Having to live his life by nature's dictates, the African has developed a sense of humility. This is because men dependent on nature must be more companionable and harmonious in order to ameliorate nature's hardships.

This African humanist orientation was reflected in tribal African societies. Three characteristics of tribal community in particular reinforced humanist values. First tribal community was a mutual society in the sense that it was organized to satisfy the basic human needs of all its members. Hence individualism is discouraged. Secondly, tribal community was an accepting society. Regardless of an individual's contribution to the welfare of the community, people are appreciated for their own sake rather than for their achievements. This attribute of traditional African societies was reflected in the African attitude toward old people. Instead of being treated as parasites on their societies, old people in traditional African societies were revered and studiously consulted for their wisdom. Thirdly, tribal community was an inclusive society. The web of relationships which involved some degree of mutual responsibility was so extensive that everybody's needs were provided for. While there are considerable differences between the societies of developing Africa and traditional

African societies, President Kaunda maintains that the psychological impact of centuries of existence in tribal societies has inculcated humanist values in African culture. In a sense, President Kaunda's embrace of Humanism is an attempt at nurturing and promulgating the humanist values in African culture the world over.⁶

It is generally posited that roles significantly affect the beliefs of political actors. A modest attempt was made to test the validity of this hypothesis in this study. By grouping and systematically content analyzing all books and speeches written and published within specified periods, a close monitoring of President Kaunda's operational code beliefs was undertaken to detect discernible changes. It must be noted that all the findings discussed here are tentative.

The first clearly discernible change in President Kaunda's operational code beliefs concerns the philosophies and practices of Democratic Capitalism and Communism. By Democratic Capitalism is meant the political and economic arrangements characteristic of the Western World, the salient features of which are: (1) parliamentary democracy, and (2) free enterprise. On the other hand, Communism refers to the highly centralized political and economic arrangements

⁶For detailed analysis of these ideas, see Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, pp. 22-47; Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part I.

characterized by the Soviet Union, China and other Communist regimes. The data seem to indicate that until about 1965, President Kaunda was at least willing to experiment with Democratic Capitalism or a slight modification thereof as opposed to Communism, which he considered then as anathema. In A Humanist in Africa published in 1966, he asserted:

Nowhere in the world is there a bad state of affairs which communists will not endeavour to make worse.⁷

From about 1966 onward there has been a discernible shift in President Kaunda's beliefs about the two ideologies. Although he is absolutely not a Communist adherent, his attitude towards Communism has become considerably more favourable. This is reflected in his most recent book. After noting some of the differences between Humanism and Communism, he asserts:

...both [Humanism and Communism] believe in and work for the transcendence of the State and all its institutions so that man will, in the final stage of development, be himself again, living as his Creator meant him to be - a man born free of, living free of and dying free from the animal in him.⁸

In contrast, since 1966, President Kaunda has come to perceive Democratic Capitalism as the root cause of many forms of social evil. In Humanism in Zambia, he asserts:

⁷Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 120.

⁸Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia, Part II, p. 8.

We fight to eliminate all forms of evil. These include the philosophy of capitalism and its offshoots of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, fascism and racism in all their manifestations.⁹

In particular, President Kaunda now seems convinced that the multi-party and the free enterprise systems are the greatest obstacles to the realization of a humanist society, not only in Zambia, but the world over. Of the free enterprise system in particular, he writes:

Capitalism breeds seeds of suspicion, fear, dissension, hatred and violence. It is devoid of the human touch - the need of love for humanity. This is not the type of social order Zambian humanists can entertain. We seek therefore to fight against capitalism not because it comes from the West, or because it is foreign, but because it is a system that has more seeds of exploitation of man by man than any other of which we know. It is the embodiment of Man's inhumanity to Man in nearly all its manifestations.¹⁰

This change in President Kaunda's beliefs with respect to Capitalism was also highlighted in his recent interview with Barbara Walters on ABC. Asked about the future of Capitalism in Africa, President Kaunda replied categorically that Capitalism has no future in Africa.¹¹ While President Kaunda's comments may refer specifically to Capitalism as practised in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth

⁹Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 104.

¹¹President Kaunda was interviewed by Barbara Walters of ABC during his visit to the United States of America in May, 1978.

centuries as distinguished from Capitalism as it is evolving today, he seems to believe in Socialism or common ownership rather than in any form of Capitalism as an instrument for promoting Humanism.¹²

Two other dimensions of the President's operational code belief system seem to have undergone some gradual changes. These relate to beliefs about optimism and non-violence. President Kaunda led Zambia to independence highly optimistic about the future of Zambia and mankind in general. But since then his optimism and belief in non-violence seems to be gradually waning as evident in the comments below. With specific reference to the possibility of a world community, he notes:

Now I know better. My ideal remains untarnished; it is my realistic expectations that have been cut down to size by observing and sharing in the moulding of one nation from a collection of tribes and races contained within arbitrarily-drawn colonial boundaries.¹³

The changes in President Kaunda's beliefs discussed above seem to have been effected by his leadership role. As Prime Minister, and finally President, the problems Kaunda has encountered in directing the affairs of Zambia have undoubtedly influenced some changes in his operational code belief system. Perhaps President Kaunda never believed in Capitalism and multi-partyism. But whatever favourable

¹²See particularly Chapter 9, "Public Ownership", Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II, pp. 51-56.

¹³Kaunda, Letter to My Children, p. 99.

attitude he may have entertained towards these features of Western political and economic systems has been largely erased by his experience as Zambia's chief executive. Because of the acquisitive greed endemic in the philosophy of Capitalism and the divisiveness of multi-party systems, President Kaunda seems convinced that these systems are the very antithesis of Humanism.¹⁴ His experience with the "Lenshina troubles"¹⁵ and the intransigence of White minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa have interjected a realization of the limits of non-violent methods. All of these seem to have influenced a realistic appraisal of President Kaunda's image of the goodness in Man, an image on which his optimism is largely predicated.

THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY

Thus far the analysis has concentrated on President Kaunda's operational code belief system. The rest of the Chapter will be devoted to assessing: (1) the utility of this study in terms of advancing our understanding of President Kaunda's decision-making behaviour and by extension the policies of Zambia; (2) the utility of the operational code approach in terms of advancing the study of Political

¹⁴See Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia Part II; Kaunda, Letter to My Children; Kaunda, The Watershed Speech.

¹⁵The "Lenshina troubles" is the name given to a series of violent clashes in 1964 between security forces and followers of prophetess, Alice Lenshina and her Lumpa Church. The Lenshina troubles cost about 700 lives, an official estimate considered conservative. See Hall, Zambia, pp. 129-30.

Science or a field thereof; and (3) the limitation of the study resulting from the data and research technique.

The Utility of President Kaunda's "Operational Code" Belief System

Every research undertaking must inevitably grapple with questions of its usefulness. In the present endeavour, we must address ourselves to the question: What is the usefulness of a knowledge of the operational code belief system of President Kaunda? In more specific terms, does a knowledge of the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda facilitate attempts to advance our understanding of his political behaviour and by extension the political behaviour of the state of Zambia. In a broader context, does a knowledge of the operational code beliefs of decision-makers advance the study of the policies of states?

This study suggests that a knowledge of the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda advances our understanding of his political behaviour and the policy of Zambia in several dimensions. In Chapter Two, it was noted that the operational code construct deals with fundamental philosophical and instrumental beliefs of decision-makers rather than some set of mechanical rules. It was further noted in that Chapter that beliefs or the belief system of decision-makers influence their decisions to a considerable extent through cognitive processes associated with the decision-making process. As a set of beliefs related to political action, a knowledge of the operational code of President Kaunda enables analysts to narrow the range of alternatives

from which his choices will be selected. Furthermore, it sensitizes analysts to the general criteria, requirements and norms underlying President Kaunda's decisions. Put differently, a knowledge of President Kaunda's operational code belief system will alert us to the values he endeavours to promote both in the internal and international political systems. Perhaps an analysis of Zambia's policy of actively supporting Black majority rule struggles in Southern Africa will illustrate the usefulness of a knowledge of the operational code of President Kaunda.

Issues, K. J. Holsti has written, are the stuff of politics.¹⁶ The salience of issues in politics is further emphasized in James Rosenau's concept of issue-area. As conceptualized, an issue-area is:

- (1) a cluster of values, the allocation of which
- (2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values.¹⁷

Perhaps no issue has been more prominent and enduring in the policies of Zambia than the issue of Black majority rule in Southern Africa. Thus its selection for analysis will

¹⁶K. J. Holsti, "Retreat From Utopia: International Relations Theory, 1945-70", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. IV, No. 2 (June, 1971), p. 176.

¹⁷James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in Farrell, Barry R. (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 81.

enable us to assess the relative influences of various factors relevant to policy-making.

It is beyond doubt that Zambia has suffered enormous economic losses on account of its support of Black majority rule struggles in Southern Africa.¹⁸ Why then is Zambia pursuing a policy clearly detrimental to its goal of economic development or, broadly conceived, "national interest"?¹⁹

As a result of geographical location and more so of colonial policies, Zambia has, until recently, been closely linked economically to Rhodesia and South Africa. The extent to which Zambia was economically dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa is demonstrated in Richard Sklar's well documented article.²⁰ Landlocked and dependent²¹ on Rhodesia and South Africa for its commerce with the outside world, Zambia leaders surely realize that actively supporting liberation movements will provoke retaliatory measures on the part of the White minority regimes. In fact there were

¹⁸See Richard Seymour Hall, The High Price of Principles (London: Hodder and Sloughton, 1969).

¹⁹The nebulousness of the concept of "national interest" is acknowledged. It is used here in a rather restricted context, i.e., issues of immediate pertinence to the national prosperity and survival of a state.

²⁰See Richard L. Sklar, "Zambia's Response to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence" in Tordoff, William (ed.), Politics in Zambia (California: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 321-62.

²¹It must be noted that since the completion of TAZARA - Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) Railway linking Zambia and Tanzania - in 1975, Zambia is virtually independent of Rhodesia and South Africa for its commerce with the world. For some evidence of this, see Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict.

clear signals that these regimes would undertake economic and military reprisals against Zambia if it became a "launching pad" for armed attacks.

Since it seems Zambian leaders are conscious of the repercussions of their decisions, then non-rational motivations may be ruled out as an explanation of Zambia's policy regarding Black majority rule in Southern Africa. As Sidney Verba has convincingly argued, decision-makers approximate a "rational" rather than a "non-rational" model - "rational" here means the conscious utilization of a means-end strategy - in their decision-making behaviour.²² Since Zambian leaders, it seems, are pursuing a means-end strategy, our earlier question should be rephrased. Instead of asking why is Zambia pursuing a policy detrimental to its "national interest", it is more appropriate to ask what ends - values and goals - is Zambia attempting to promote by its active support of Black majority rule?

We have until now referred to Zambia's policy regarding issues of Black majority rule as that of actively supporting liberation movements. In addition to supporting the liberation movements, Zambia also occasionally engages in some sort of contacts with the White minority regimes for purposes of exploring peaceful solutions to the issues. In 1968, Pres-

²²See Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System" in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 217-31.

ident Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa exchanged correspondences. These were followed by visits of emissaries of the government of South Africa and a meeting between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster in Singapore.²³ In September 25th, 1977, Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, met President Kaunda in Lusaka.²⁴

Our discussion has attempted to demonstrate that Zambia's policy is not consistent with values and goals of its national interest narrowly defined. What values and goals is it then consistent with? We shall attempt to answer this question with the aid of the "congruence" procedure.

The "congruence" procedure is a technique for establishing whether a political actor's decisions are consistent with his operational code beliefs or some aspects of it. The establishment of consistency or congruence between the two variables is deemed to demonstrate correlation between the two variables.²⁵


Recall that the essence of President Kaunda's master-beliefs is predicated on the sacredness and goodness of man.

²³Details of the contacts between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster are contained in Dear Mr. Vorster Details of Exchanges Between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

²⁴See Africa Confidential Vol. 13, No. 22 (November 4, 1977); p. 1.

²⁵See Alexander L. George, "The Causal Nexus Between 'Operational Code' Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: Problems of Theory and Methodology", a preliminary draft of a paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, February 22-25, 1978.

These master-beliefs we refer to as humanist beliefs and represent as value "1". Zambia's national interest we represent as value "3". Figure 2 attempts to summarize the possible consistencies between the independent-intervening variables - values "1" and "3" - and the dependent variables - credible policy options. The dependent variables, sandwiched between the independent variables, consist of four policy options. Option 1 - active support of Black majority rule movements, the policy Zambia presently pursues - consists of,



Symbols:

—————→ Solid Arrow = Consistent with

- - - - -→ Broken Arrow = Not Consistent with

Figure 2: Diagrammatic Representation of Belief-Policy Congruence

*For some of the ideas in Figure 2, see Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus Between 'Operational Code' Beliefs and Decision-making Behavior: Problems of Theory and Methodology".

though not necessarily all, the following forms of support: The granting of political asylum to political exiles, admission of refugees, establishment of field offices, payment of dues to the O.A.U. liberation, attempts to unify liberation movements and other activities likely to promote the realization of Black majority rule in Southern Africa. Some of these forms of support, as Vincent Khapoya noted, are not without economic and military risks from the targeted regimes.²⁶ Thus Option 1 undoubtedly demonstrates a high level of commitment to Black majority rule; it is even more so when it is clearly detrimental to one's national interest.

Option 2 - passive support of Black majority rule - consists of forms of support as minimal as the mere condemnation of White minority regimes in international forums. This policy is usually pursued by states which feel their membership in the Organization of African Unity obligates them to demonstrate some minimum level of commitment to Black majority rule.

Option 3 - active support of White minority regimes in Southern Africa - may range from the active defense of minority regimes in international forums to the participation in military operations against liberation movements. Lastly, policy Option 4 - passive support of status quo

²⁶Vincent B. Khapoya, The Politics of Decision: A Comparative Study of Africa Policy Toward the Liberation Movements (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1973), pp. 25-32.

regimes - entails the establishment of diplomatic and other relationships with White minority regimes.

As shown in Figure 2, value "1" (Kaunda's beliefs) is consistent with the behavioural characteristics of Zambia's policy. In fact, none of the other policy options is consistent with value "1". On the other hand, value "3" is logically consistent with all the other policy options but Option 1. Thus, since value "1" is consistent only with Zambia's policy, we impute "causal" weight to Kaunda's operational code beliefs for the policy. Had value "1" been consistent with two or more policy options, then clearly some other factors must explain why option 1 is preferred to the others; in which case the explanatory power attributed to President Kaunda's beliefs would be minimal.

But even though greater explanatory power may be attributed to Kaunda's beliefs by virtue of being consistent only with Zambia's policy, the question may be asked whether Kaunda's beliefs are a necessary condition for Zambia policy. Stated differently, we may ask whether President Kaunda, and therefore his operational code beliefs, is indispensable to Zambia's policy with regard to Black majority rule in Southern Africa.

Two conditions must be established in order to conclude that Kaunda's operational code beliefs are a necessary condition for Zambia's policy. First, it must be established that the beliefs consistent with Zambia's policy are idiosyncratic to President Kaunda in the sense that they are not

probably shared by any other decision maker. Secondly, it must be established that Zambia's policy on the issue of Black majority rule is not inevitable in the sense that given its circumstances, Zambia can pursue only the present policy.

If we are to conclude that President Kaunda's beliefs are a necessary condition, we must attempt to assess the extent to which it is likely that his absence from Zambian politics would preclude its present policy regarding issues of Black majority rule in Southern Africa. Since there are many other decision-makers in Zambia, it might well be that the beliefs (value, "I") consistent with Zambia's policy are in fact common to a large majority of these political actors. The possibility of belief complementarity among Zambian decision-makers does not detract from the explanatory power attributed to the beliefs per se. It does, however, raise the question of whether the beliefs are idiosyncratic to President Kaunda. If the beliefs are in fact common to a large majority of Zambian decision-makers, in which case President Kaunda's beliefs are not indispensable to the decision, can we then legitimately attribute explanatory power to Kaunda's operational code beliefs?

Admittedly, it is almost impossible to make a precise determination of whether the beliefs are idiosyncratic to Kaunda. Of course, a certain degree of belief or value complementarity among Zambia decision-makers must exist if there is to be a collective decision-making process. The

issue of whether the beliefs are idiosyncratic to President Kaunda, and if not, whether we can attribute "causal" weight to his operational code beliefs, may be disposed of in two ways. First, we can admit the possibility of belief complementarity among Zambian decision-makers yet attribute "causal" weight to President Kaunda's operational code beliefs because (a) he is the focus of our study and (b) he is the President. We noted in Chapter One that leaders of developing countries wield much greater influence over the policies of their countries than their counterparts in developed countries. To the extent that this is true we may surmise that President Kaunda's policy preferences will take precedence regardless of the complementarity of beliefs or the lack of it. The second way to dispose of the issue is to advance a plausible argument that the beliefs are indeed idiosyncratic to President Kaunda.

Indeed there is evidence to suggest that Kaunda's operational code beliefs are idiosyncratic to him. The strong religious influence in his Humanist philosophy, as noted elsewhere, derived from his childhood environment; experiences, it seems, no other Zambian decision-maker shares with President Kaunda. That the beliefs are peculiar to President Kaunda perhaps accounts for the high degree of congruency between his operational code beliefs and Zambia's policy. As was noted earlier in this section, Zambia's policy is a composite of: (1) ardent support for Black majority rule to the extent of advocating military

solutions as a last resort, (2) dialogue with Western powers and White minority regimes for purposes of impressing on them the necessity for peaceful resolution of the issues, and (3) opposition to a significant Communist role. (This seeming contradiction of the policy reflects the nature of Kaunda's operational code beliefs, a code which on the one hand glorifies man and dismisses any compromise when humanity is at stake and on the other, advocates non-violent methods and the necessity for resolving rather than suppressing conflicts (beliefs 1, 3, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 58, 59).

The condition of the inevitability of Zambia's policy, as that of whether the beliefs are idiosyncratic to President Kaunda, defies precise determination. In essence, this condition attempts to assess whether Zambia's policy is determined by factors of its geographical location, its membership in the O.A.U. and its economic dependence on Southern Africa.²⁷ While some writers have contended that the involvement of the states bordering the target areas is inevitable,²⁸ there is, however, evidence to the contrary. Of course the issue of whether involvement is inevitable is in part an issue of how the word "involvement" is interpreted.

²⁷The notion of the inevitability of Policy as used here is similar to Fred Greenstein's notion of the "restructurability-irrestructurability" of the environments of decisions. See Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 42-44.

²⁸See Kenneth Grundy, "Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Struggle", Africa Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 1 (April-June, 1970).

For our purpose, "involvement" is construed as defined in the description of policy option 1 - active support of Black majority rule struggle. Thus interpreted, it is a fact that involvement is not inevitably determined by factors of geographical location, membership in the O.A.U. and economic interdependence with target areas. The policies of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Egypt, and Algeria with regard to issues of Black majority rule in Southern Africa demonstrate this fact. On the one hand Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi - all contiguous states to the target areas, all members of the O.A.U. and all dependent to some degree on the target regimes - have steadfastly declined to support liberation movements actively. These states point to the military superiority of the White minority regimes and their economic dependence on these regimes as reasons for not supporting struggles for Black majority rule. On the other hand, Egypt and Algeria - both members of the O.A.U., yet more than a thousand miles away from the nearest target area - have actively played a critical role in the training and equipping of liberation fighters.

Since the policies of bordering states are not inevitably determined, why is it that of all the states with similar economic ties with the target areas only Zambia actively supports liberation movements or struggles for Black majority rule? While it is true that Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique are all active supporters of Black majority rule, none of these states is as economically

dependent on either Rhodesia or South Africa as is Zambia. The four other former British colonies that are as dependent as Zambia on the target areas - Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi - none actively supports liberation struggles.

Richard Sklar seems to suggest that Zambia's support of liberation movements was rather modest until it acquired some defensive capability. Vincent Khapoya concluded that military capability is highly related to liberation support. While these statements may be entirely valid and while Zambia may no longer be vulnerable to economic reprisals from the White minority regimes, the fact remains that it is still largely vulnerable to their (the White minority regimes') military power. To the extent that Zambia is, its support of Black majority rule movements in Southern Africa must be rooted on a commitment that transcends its own national interest and obligations of membership in the O.A.U. Put differently, it seems Zambia's policy of actively supporting Black majority rule movements is considerably influenced by a pious devotion to some moral principles; moral principles which are inexorably part of the operational code beliefs of President Kaunda.

The Utility of the "Operational Code" Approach

Since the usefulness of any research undertaking derives from its specific findings as well as questions and suggestions it raises for further inquiries, we shall venture some comments on the utility of the operational code

approach itself. It is a truism that research approaches influence the research projects undertaken in any academic discipline as well as the scope of the projects. No small wonder then that the Traditional-Behavioral debate has centered essentially around the utility of various approaches in terms of advancing the study of politics. What then is the likely contribution of the operational code approach to the advancement of the study of politics?

As the central ongoing concern of the discipline, at least its behavioural component, is the formulation and testing of reliable theories, advancement of the study of politics is here interpreted as contribution to reliable theory building. Based on observations deduced from this study, as well as others, the operational code approach is likely to contribute, at best, to the development of a low-level theory about decision-making and decision-makers. The reasons for this derive from the nature of the approach itself. The operational code approach is characterized by two related salient features. The first of these is the foreign policy orientation of the construct. The second feature relates to the enemy-conflict orientation of the construct.

While the foreign policy orientation of the operational code construct is not as apparent as enemy-conflict orientation, evidence from studies utilizing the construct and other features associated with it, point to a design basically oriented more to foreign policy than domestic

policy decision-making. Perhaps an analysis of some of the features of the decision-making approach may best highlight this contention.

The operational code approach, as noted in earlier sections, is an attempt at supplementing the utility of the decision-making approach; a fact perhaps evidenced in Alexander George's title of the approach: "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making". The close relationship between the two approaches explains in part the foreign policy bias of the operational code approach. While the decision-making approach may not have been specifically designed for foreign policy analysis, it has, however, been mainly used in this field since its introduction into the discipline. The complementarity of assumptions - assumptions of conscious moves and choices - germane to both the field of foreign policy and the decision-making approach seems to account for the almost exclusive use of the approach in foreign policy analysis.

The second feature - the enemy-conflict orientation of the code - derives from the assumption that a political actor's beliefs about the nature of politics are importantly influenced by his perception of his opponents. This bias seems to stem from Nathan Leites' original study of the Bolsheviks, who, it may be noted, were profoundly more conflict-oriented than many other political actors. And since the notion of the enemy plays a more prominent role in foreign policy than in domestic policy calculations,

it explains to a large extent why foreign policy decisions are deemed to be characterized, relative to domestic decisions, by a goal-maximizing strategy.

As many political scientists have noted, international political systems are in many respects similar to "primitive" political systems in terms of their lack of final authority. In other words, international systems are characterized by low levels of formal institutionalization.²⁹ Because of this attribute, issues which related to these political domains are deemed to be more conflictual than those that relate to domestic political systems, since there is a greater heterogeneous mix of vital interests and values coupled with the lack of final authority in international political systems.

The foregoing discussion is intended to demonstrate that the operational code approach is basically oriented to the extraction of beliefs more pertinent to foreign policy decision-making. This is because its basic assumptions are derived from a foreign policy perspective. What then are the implications of this foreign policy perspective in terms of the approach's utility?

²⁹For a comparative analysis of "primitive" political systems and international political systems, see Chadwick, F. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics", American Political Science Review LVII (June, 1963), p. 414-19; and Roger D. Masters, "World Politics as a Primitive Political System", in Rosenau, James N. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 104-118.

There is some evidence that because of its foreign policy orientation, the operational code approach may be less capable of extracting the salient beliefs of (1) political actors of the Third World, particularly those of the non-Communist bloc; and (2) political actors who perceive the political universe as harmonious.

The neat distinction between foreign and domestic policies is essentially a convenient analytical device. Relative to their counterparts in the developed nations, it is generally recognized that leaders of the developing world make very little distinction between foreign and domestic policies.³⁰ Numerous reasons account for this tendency. Perhaps the most important is the fact that developing countries are so dependent on the external environment as to make domestic and foreign issues too closely intertwined to render any distinction meaningful.³¹ Thus because of overwhelming domestic problems stemming from both operative internal and external conditions and because of a relative lack of power in the international system, leaders of developing countries are more preoccupied with issues of immediate internal consequences. To the extent that this

³⁰ See Pablo, Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal and External Politics of Underdeveloped Countries", in Farrell, Barry R. (ed.) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 131-149.

³¹ For some comments on the extent to which developing countries are dependent on the external environment, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Farrell, Barry R. (ed.) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 27-42. Michael O'Leary, "Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations", in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 324-346.

is true, it seems more appropriate to focus on beliefs pertinent to this area. That the operational code approach is limited in this score perhaps explains why the operational code beliefs of leaders of the developing and the developed countries are different.³² Whereas the operational code beliefs of leaders of the developed countries - mostly North American leaders - are specific in terms of substantive issues on various dimensions of the operational code construct, the operational code beliefs of their counterpart in developing countries are somewhat more general. This general nature of the operational code beliefs of leaders of developing countries may be attributed to the limited nature of the questions constituting the operational code construct. The questions, it seems, are inappropriate to getting at the operative beliefs of leaders of the developing countries.

The problems raised in the foregoing discussion were somewhat acknowledged by Alexander George and Ole Holsti. George acknowledged the necessity of supplementing "attention of the actor's image of the opponent with observations about

³²Previous studies have also noted some basic differences between the operational code beliefs of leaders of the developed and developing nations. See Kathleen A. Weekes, An Application of the "Operational Code" to Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago (unpublished masters thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Windsor, 1974), pp. 127-8; Constantin S. Presvelos, The "Operational Code" of Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus (unpublished masters major paper submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Windsor, 1977), pp. 88-9.

his orientation towards political friends and followers".³³ Holsti, on the other hand, hinted at necessary modifications in the construct to examine the political beliefs of non-American and non-Soviet leaders.³⁴

CONCLUSION

The limitations of the operational code approach noted in our previous discussion can legitimately be considered as limitations to this study. However, our concern here is directed at limitations emanating from our data and research technique. In Chapter Two, it was noted that our data is derived by qualitatively content analyzing President Kaunda's books and speeches. A note was also made of the issue of the validity of inference centering around alternative models of communication and its probable implications for our study. Since our use of qualitative content analysis has relied on the assumption that President Kaunda's communications are valid indicators of his beliefs, we may ask how valid is the assumption? Stated in a manner directly pertinent to our study, we may ask whether President Kaunda's communications are valid indicators of his beliefs?

Evidence indicates that President Kaunda's communications validly reflect his beliefs. First, it has been

³³George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", p. 189.

³⁴Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", p. 154.

adequately established that the President writes almost all of his speeches and books. The question of authorship deals with the very core of the issue of whether communications validly reflect the communicator's beliefs. This is because beliefs reflected in speeches or books written by professional speech or ghost writers may not be validly indicating the communicator's beliefs. Secondly, we have utilized another indirect technique of verification. By systematically comparing the frequency of certain recurring themes in President Kaunda's speeches and books and the manner in which he expresses these themes, a pattern emerged which seems to indicate that these are some of his core beliefs. For instance, there is hardly any piece of writing attributed to President Kaunda that does not contain a reverent reference to God, the value of man and the virtues of the philosophy of Humanism.

While there exists a high degree of congruence or consistency between President Kaunda's operational code belief system and Zambia's policy with regard to issues of Black majority rule in Southern Africa, perhaps the most important foreign policy decision Zambia has ever had to make, it must be emphasized that congruence or consistency between beliefs and policies demonstrates at best a high correlation between the two variables. This whole area of the relationship between beliefs and decisions or policies needs to be more rigorously and systematically treated. In particular, it would be very interesting to examine the

following hypothesis: That President Kaunda's humanitarian beliefs prevail in all of his decisions. Such an undertaking may highlight the relative "causal" weight of the operative situational, organizational and role variables vis-a-vis beliefs variable.

The operational code belief system of political actors specifies general preference relation. Notwithstanding the qualifications noted above, this study indicates that President Kaunda's operational code belief system performs this function. The discussion relating President Kaunda's operational code beliefs to Zambia's policy of actively supporting Black majority rule movements in Southern Africa seems to demonstrate that the rationale and behavioural component of the policy are consistent with the President's philosophical and instrumental beliefs. One tentative hypothesis that may be advanced based on this study is that the extent to which operational code beliefs influence policy is related to the salience of the values of the issue-area. The more salient the issue-area, that is, the more fundamental values are at issue, the greater the influence of the operational code belief system on policy. Thus, while a knowledge of President Kaunda's operational code belief system may not enable us to predict his political behaviour or the policy Zambia will pursue in any given issue, it is here concluded that it is, however, indispensable to attempts at explaining some of Zambia's policies.

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